

HOW THE ARABELLION AFFECTS THE STRENGTH OF EGYPT AS A NATION STATE

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General Studies

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14. ABSTRACT Nearly four years after the beginning of the Arabellion of 2011, the upheaval that compelled President Mubarak to resign, Egypt faces another at least semi-democratic government led by the former Commander in Chief General Abdel Fattah El Sisi. However, the current situation is not just a reset. Circumstances and power structure changed several times. Although the new government is now in a favorable position, a simple restoation is out of the question. The Arabellion initiated the first steps to a civil society. The population, and in particular the youth, gained experience in political participation. The experiment might have failed, but the experience of change has left the power holders with a new pressure to legitimize. Despite almost absolute power, the government is aware that its initiative to offer a pragmatic rebalancing of power to the relevant protagonists is key to solving the unchanged social, political, and economic issues. Contemporaries consider the Arabellion a failure, but the new constitution facilitates a guided change. Egypt is at a crossroad once again. Both futures are possible, either a system of unsustainable short-term concentration of power, or a pragmatic, sustainable, and beneficial power sharing between the relevant protagonists. Nevertheless, the lethargy of the Mubarak era is gone.					
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ABSTRACT

HOW THE ARABELLION AFFECTS THE STRENGTH OF EGYPT AS A NATION STATE, by Major (GS) Ralph W. Peter, 141 pages.

Nearly four years after the beginning of the Arabellion of 2011, the upheaval that compelled President Mubarak to resign, Egypt faces another at least semi-democratic government led by the former Commander in Chief General Abdel Fattah El Sisi. However, the current situation is not just a reset. Circumstances and power structure changed several times. Although the new government is now in a favorable position, a simple restoration is out of the question. The Arabellion initiated the first steps to a civil society. The population, and in particular the youth, gained experience in political participation. The experiment might have failed, but the experience of change has left the power holders with a new pressure to legitimize. Despite almost absolute power, the government is aware that its initiative to offer a pragmatic rebalancing of power to the relevant protagonists is key to solving the unchanged social, political, and economic issues. Contemporaries consider the Arabellion a failure, but the new constitution facilitates a guided change. Egypt is at a crossroad once again. Both futures are possible, either a system of unsustainable short-term concentration of power, or a pragmatic, sustainable, and beneficial power sharing between the relevant protagonists. Nevertheless, the lethargy of the Mubarak era is gone.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

How does the self-immolation of an unknown street vendor relate to the resignation of a long lasting head of state of a nation of 80 million people that is 1,300 miles away? What are the deep-rooted reasons for an ongoing revolutionary process that has lasted three years and is still open? How are the self-conception of the population and the integrity of a state affected? What are the authoritative forecasts for a nation in the process of self-discovery and change?

The origin of all these questions is related to the 17 December 2010 incident when a fruit vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid to protest against the local authorities. It was a tragic act which today is considered to have directly triggered the Tunisian Revolution and to have been the signal of what has subsequently been called the “Arab Spring”¹ with major effects on the whole Arab world and Egypt in particular.

¹ Ibrahim Al-Koni, in Interview by Susanne Schanda, “Herr Bouazizi ist der Christus unserer Zeit.” Der Tagesspiegel, 1 March 2011, accessed 23 July 2014, <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/kultur/interview-herr-bouazizi-ist-der-christus-unserer-zeit-/3892926.html>, 3. “Seine Tat war der Funke, der den Flächenbrand entzündet und letztlich die ganze arabische Welt verändert hat.” [His act was the spark that ignited the fire and that finally changed the whole Arab world.].

On 11 February 2011, Egypt's Vice President Omar Suleiman declared the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. The nearly 30-year rule of the "Pharaoh"² ends abruptly and unexpectedly after two weeks of massive protests by the Egyptian citizens.

On 30 June 2012, after free and democratic elections, Mohammed Morsi, a declared Islamist, is sworn in as president of Egypt. Repressed for decades, the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate was now head of state of the most populous Arab state; the armed forces compelled him to resign only a year later.

A short two years later, on 28 April 2014, after only two days in court the Egyptian Judge Said Jussif Sabri sentenced 683 followers of the Muslim Brotherhood to the death penalty. While the United Nations and non-governmental organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International criticized the conduct of the trial, the interim Egyptian government influenced by the military defended the judge's course of action.³

On 25 and 26 May 2014, the Egyptian population voted for the new president after the armed forces overthrew Morsi in July 2013. Favorite by a mile was the former head of the Egyptian Armed Forces Abd al-Fattah El Sisi. He won the election with nearly 97 percent of all votes; the turnout was only about 47 percent, nearly half of the first free election in 2011. The national and international response goes from cautious

² Dina Shehata, "The Fall of the Pharaoh—How Hosni Mubarak's Reign Came to an End," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2011), accessed 17 November 2014, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67687/dina-shehata/the-fall-of-the-pharaoh>.

³ Orla Guerin, "Egypt: Brotherhood's Badie among Mass Death Sentences," BBC News, 28 April 2014, accessed 30 April 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27186339>.

optimism to comparison with the referendum that ratified Russia's takeover of the Crimea.⁴

Today, it is a common understanding that events in Tunisia represented a profound break, and that its events had an impact on every country between the Maghreb and the Persian Gulf. Moreover, it is clear that the widespread, particularly Western⁵ one-dimensional understanding of a monolithic Greater Middle East is no longer valid. Even though the Jasmine Revolution⁶ initially inspired protesters in the neighboring countries, the development over the last two years has shown that there was by no means a domino effect.⁷ On the one hand there are the perseverance of the governing elites in Saudi Arabia, the military crackdown on the uprising in Bahrain, the peaceful constitutional transformation in the Kingdom of Morocco and the overthrow of the regime in Tunisia and Egypt and their democratic elections; on the other hand there are the bloody civil war in Libya, the ongoing bloody civil war in Syria, the latest rise of terrorist organizations like al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil-Iraq wa al-Sham⁸ in Iraq and Syria, as well as the recently

⁴ Jake Flanagin, "In Egypt, Back to Rule By a Strongman," *The New York Times*, 8 June 2014, accessed 9 June 2014, <http://op-talk.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/08/a-roundup-of-reactions-to-sisis-swearing-in>.

⁵ The common word and terminus technicus "the West" is used in accordance with the concept described by Heinrich August Winkler, *Geschichte des Westens: Von den Anfängen in der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Beck, 2009), 119.

⁶ Thomas Schmid, "Tunesien: Die Jasmin-Revolution," in *Die arabische Revolution*, eds., Frank Nordhausen and Thomas Schmid (Berlin: Christoph Links, 2011), 15-18.

⁷ Wolfgang Kraushaar, *Der Aufruhr der Ausgebildeten. Vom Arabischen Frühling zur Occupy-Bewegung* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2012), 9.

⁸ Al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil-Iraq wa al-Sham is more properly known as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL). The organization just

blazing conflict between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip. All these events have shown that despite the similarity of the grievances decried by the protesters and despite the protestors' demands, local and highly contextual situations, circumstances and relationships have been influencing the development in the nations of the Greater Middle East.⁹

In this respect, the much-quoted and partially ecstatically picked-up and overly optimistic expression "Arab Spring"¹⁰ as well as the hopes of many authors¹¹ were not only caught up in the partially bloody reality, but also turned out to be a unilaterally simplifying black-and-white sketch. In fact, these manifold Arab rebellions developed in accordance with their respective cultural and regional backgrounds in different fashions, at different speeds and with different and still unclear goals. In this context, the extremes of these currents range from an "Arab Spring" to an "Islamic Winter,"¹² and their "actual

re-branded to Islamic State (IS). Patrick J. Lyons and Mona El-Naggar, "What to Call Iraq Fighters? Experts Vary on S's and L's," *New York Times*, 18 June 2014, accessed 7 August 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/world/middleeast/islamic-state-in-iraq-and-syria-or-islamic-state-in-iraq-and-the-levant.html>.

⁹ Volker Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen* (Munich: Pantheon, 2011), 7-9.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Heiko Flottau, "Von Kairo bis Damaskus: Die Rückkehr eines Volkes," *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, Monatszeitschrift*, no. 6 (2011): 57, 59-60; Juliane von Mittelstaedt, Mathieu von Rohr, Volkhard Windfuhr, "Der 18. Tag: Ägypten," *Der Spiegel: das deutsche Nachrichten-Magazin*, no. 7 (2011): 80-84.

¹² Gil Yaron, "Israel: Ein Staat igelt sich ein," *Arabische Zeitenwende. Aufstand und Revolution in der arabischen Welt* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2012), 233.

moment of surprise was not the revolution of 2011 but rather the fact that it did not break out very much earlier.”¹³

Referring to the mentioned sequence of events in Egypt, there is still much uncertainty about the outcome of the Arabellion there. The country suffered a lot of economic, social, and domestic setback during the last three years. Indeed, the new president, who was the former head of the armed forces, Abd al-Fattah El Sisi was recently elected, but the circumstances of the process due to democratic standards is questionable.¹⁴ The country still lacks a firm government, clearly supported by a majority of the population. Although the election of a former general looks like a signal for a counter-revolution of the well-known Ancien Régime with a face-lift, the question whether, and if affirmed, how much democratization is necessary or desired by Egypt’s people is still open.

Against this complex and dynamic background, this thesis focuses on one specific element of the newly developing power architecture in the Greater Middle East. Egypt, the former geopolitical center and most populous country in the region, is still undergoing a painful process of transformation.¹⁵ The country is still seeking a future form of government, a composition of the society, and its self-concept in the region. The context of the depicted events, from the self-immolation in Tunisia to the latest presidential election in Egypt, at least for now, the comeback of a semi-democratic government is the

¹³ Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 14.

¹⁴ David D. Kirkpatrick, “International Observers Find Egypt’s Presidential Election Fell Short of Standards,” *The New York Times*, 30 May 2014, A8.

¹⁵ Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 186-187.

setting for the guiding theme. This thesis offers an up-to-date analysis of major conditions and development dynamics of a state and society amidst a process of change in order to answer the initial questions and outline well-grounded assumptions of Egypt's future perspectives as a nation state.

Assumptions

Despite the fact that this study is not based on original Arabic sources, the author is of the particular opinion that met concerns to this effect. The result is the wide choice of open sources of three continents, the reflection of contradictory opinions, and in particular the consideration of translated publications of domestic authors. Moreover, the analysis draws upon the author's expertise as a former public instructor for foreign and security policies on behalf of the German Armed Forces and his personal experience in the Middle East region.

Limitations

The study analyzes and reflects only information that is available through unclassified sources, written in English, French, or German, mainly literature, articles, and periodicals published in the United States, Germany, and the European Union. Furthermore, the thesis accessed available English publications from Egypt and the Greater Middle East region.

Delimitations

The events in Egypt and the Greater Middle East region are still in the flow and subject to continuous change. That is why this study only relies on information available until October 2014. Furthermore, the research is going to focus on the domestic situation

in Egypt as a foundation for the analysis of the effects Arabellion has on the country. The events in neighboring countries and their influence are largely excluded. The intent is that this study contributes to situational understanding and enables further analysis of the complex relations in the Greater Middle East.

Problem Statement

Egypt is the most populous country in the Greater Middle East. This is paramount among many factors that describe its key role as a former stability factor and mediator in the region; especially for the West until the start of the revolution. Furthermore, there are the shared borders and the peace treaty with Israel. Given that, the state of Egypt in an ongoing process of revolution, facing the risk of long-term instability is more than a challenge for its people; it might be the final step to a Greater Middle East that is totally out of control.

In the past three years, the country underwent the uprising of wide swaths of the population—especially the youth in the spotlight of worldwide media—the end of the Pharaoh Mubarak. The rise and momentarily fall of the Muslim Brotherhood, and currently a second attempt to find its unique way of democracy, under the guidance of the armed forces. The general framework is complex. First, the development of a stable political system is still an open project. The lately elected President Abd al-Fattah El Sisi consolidated the traditional preeminence of the armed forces in the Egyptian society, for now. However, neither the new constitution of 2014 is filled with life so far, nor is the de facto form of government determined. Second, the Egyptian society is torn apart between

diverging political and social groups. The Salafiyya¹⁶ stands opposed to radical modernization, the Muslim Brotherhood is banned, urban and rural population have a different idea of tradition than the youth. Above all is the military and the economy the sorry state of the economy. The ongoing uncertainty of Egypt's future, slashed revenues from tourism as the principal source of income. The state, and with it the armed forces as major commercial actors, face the risk of becoming incapable of action, and incapable of fulfilling domestic and foreign governmental duties and responsibilities. This weakness in essential sources of national power challenges the strength of Egypt as a nation state.

This is why the development of the domestic situation in Egypt and the future of this nation are on one hand crucial for political balance in the region. Moreover, understanding the mechanisms of this society opens the door for further situational understanding of a region in change.

¹⁶ Salafism is a socially and religiously ultraconservative movement of Islam which has an aspiration to mentally return to the predecessors of the first three generations of Muslims and their original ways of Islam; the term "Salafi" originates from the Arabic phrase, "as-salaf as-saliheen" and refers to these predecessors. Founded on Quran and Sunna the Salafiyya generally rejects former and current innovations of the Islam. The term "Salafi" is also used to refer specifically to non-Saudi Wahhabi. Venetia Rainey, "What is Salafism and Should We Be Worried?" *The Week*, 20 April 2011, accessed 10 May 2014, <http://www.theweek.co.uk/politics/6073/what-salafism-and-should-we-be-worried>; Mohamed ed Masbah, "Moving towards Political Participation: The Moderation of Moroccan Salafis since the Beginning of the Arab Spring," *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, January 2013, accessed 8 September 2014, http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/moroccan_salafis_moving_towards_political_participation.html.

Thesis Question

This thesis examines the following primary research question: How does the Arabellion¹⁷ affect the strength of Egypt as a nation state? Moreover the following secondary questions enumerate and focus the thesis question.

Secondary Questions

As part of the analysis and in order to contribute to the answer for the primary research question, the thesis is going to discuss these supporting questions:

1. What were the dynamics of the two overthrows (from Mubarak to Morsi to El Sisi)?
2. How are the self-conception of the population and the integrity of the state affected?
3. Who are the relevant actors; what does the power structure between these actors look like?
4. What are the effects of an economy driven by the armed forces?
5. What will Egypt's society, political system, and economy look like in the future?
6. What will Egypt's contribution be to the political environment in the region? Will it be a blueprint for its neighbors?

¹⁷ Arabellion is an art term to describe the characteristics of upheaval movement both in a non-judgemental and neutral manner and in consideration of the unique situation in Arabia. Peter Scholl-Latour, *Arabiens Stunde der Wahrheit. Aufruhr an der Schwelle Europas* (Berlin: Ullstein, 2011), 8.

Significance of the Study

The major contribution of this study is the highly topical perspective on the current situation in Egypt. The guiding theme is the analysis of Egypt's development dynamics taking into consideration that Egypt is a state and society amidst a process of change and a process of finding its new position in terms of domestic and foreign policy. The term Arabellion describes varying types of change, not a priori progress in the Arab world. The situation in Egypt is one element in a dynamic and complex environment. This study will foster understanding of the specific parameters and determinants that drive the development in Egypt. The focus on the impacts of the domestic situation, as well as possible consequences on foreign policies of Egypt facilitate an evaluation of the country's regional role. In this way, the study makes a small contribution to the comprehension of societies in the Greater Middle East, as well as the mechanisms of politics in the Middle East conflict.

CHAPTER 2

PARADIGM AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Overview

The aim of this study is to research in a qualitative analysis, how the Arabellion affects Egypt's strength as a nation state. That is why the thesis identifies and investigates the major effects of the political environment, society, and economy as sources of power.

As part of the analysis and in order to contribute to answer the primary aim of the study, the thesis discusses the following supporting questions:

1. What were the dynamics of the two overthrows (from Mubarak to Morsi to El Sisi)?
2. How are the self-conception of the population and the integrity of the state affected?
3. Who are the relevant actors; what does the power structure between these actors look like?
4. What are the effects of an economy driven by the armed forces?
5. What will Egypt's society, political system, and economy look like in the future?
6. What will Egypt's contribution be to the political environment in the region?
Will it be a blueprint for its neighbors?

The examination and discussion intends to improve the understanding¹⁸ of the depicted thematic constellation, contributes to multi-perspective reflection, and develops a critical point of view.

Therefore, the starting point is a short but concise overview of Egypt's history. The focus is on the development of the republic in the pre-Mubarak era in order to gain insights of historic events and their effects, as well as a common understanding of mechanisms of power and the self-concept of the country and people. This basis enables an analysis of the factors that President Mubarak developed to install his regime and retain power for nearly 30 years. Closely related are the sources of power Mubarak used and the question of which elements failed during the upheaval of 2011. The historic review concludes with the consideration of Mohammed Morsi's presidency, the military's return to power, and the ongoing process of establishing a new government and implementing the latest constitution.

The analysis focuses on the political, social, and economic situation of the country to describe how Egypt's strength as a nation state is affected. A prerequisite is an outline of general parameters of the domestic and foreign politics. This is the starting point for the analysis of the current power constellation in Egypt and the most relevant actors in the political decision making process. On that note, it is necessary to reflect on the influence of the Constitution of 2011, as well as person and position of the current president in order to evaluate the Egyptian political structure as a source of power. The next step is to examine the social structure of the country. Based on the knowledge

¹⁸ Michael Q. Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), 9.

gained about the major actors, the study deconstructs where the lines of separation are and the common sense that unites this society. Moreover, it is important to identify possible breaking points in the social cohesion and to determine their importance for the development of the country. If nothing less, the social cohesion is also driven by the confidence of the people in the state to fulfill its function. The state itself depends on economic prosperity. Against this background, it is paramount to reflect the crossholding between the Egyptian military and the economy. It is the final key factor to develop predictions about the future of Egypt as a nation state.

The historical review in combination with the analysis of the current political, social, and economic environment set the ground to understand the dynamics in Egypt. Therefore, the gain of comprehensive situational awareness allows the development of well-grounded assumptions of the country's future. The thesis offers a perspective of a future Egypt, the chances and risks in the process of self-discovery and change. It answers the question of the Arabellion's contribution and its long-term effects on the nation's future constitution. The assessment of the strength of this nation state offers a perspective about Egypt's role as a blueprint for neighbor countries, as well as its contribution in the regional political environment.

Research Method

The methodology of this qualitative study is in general text analysis amended by the author's experience as a subject matter expert in foreign and security policies and experience in analysis methods as a master in education science. The epistemic

foundation roots in Philipp Mayring's concept of qualitative content analysis¹⁹ in order to ensure an intersubjective reproducible, systematic working style and text analysis. In contrast to quantitative methods, the approach is in general to explore phenomena, describe and explain relationships, and adapt new insights along an open-ended question format. The primary areas of application of qualitative content analysis are interviews, literature, biographies, discussions, and contemporary documents.²⁰ Hence, this method is particularly appropriate for this highly topical object of research and facilitates methodical preliminaries of the analysis.

This study follows the basic assumptions of qualitative content analysis insofar, that the available information sources are summarized to filter the quintessence and deviate inductive categories. The groundwork consists of four steps: first, the detailed definition and foundation of the research question; second, the choice and characterization of the sources; third, the definition of the direction of analysis; and fourth, the determination of the particular research objects.²¹ The latter led to the secondary questions and the structure of chapters 3 and 4. The further steps of the concept are to revise and refine the selected categories. This is done by interviews and field studies that are not applied in the preparation of the analysis.

¹⁹ Philipp A. E. Mayring and Eva Brunner, "Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse," in *Handbuch qualitative Forschungsmethoden in der Erziehungswissenschaft*, eds., H. Boller, B. Frieberthäuser, A. Langer, A. Prengel, and S. Richter (Weinheim: Beltz Paedagogik, 2010), 323-334.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

Content Analysis

Founded on the research method, the text analysis pursues the goal of a methodologically structured comprehension of the collected information in order to highlight the actual situation, the relations between individuals, groups, and events. The depicted approach facilitates reconstruction and understanding of the operational rationales of actors in the overall context. Consequently, this is the premise for deductive reasoning that points to substantial conclusions about the existing interaction structures and valid prognoses for future actions. The perspective of the content analysis is the term of political power and its multiple dimensions in Egypt, completed by a consideration of patterns of individual decision-making.

Political Power

The Renaissance politician and philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli characterized in his publication “The Prince” a pessimistic anthropology of human being and the mechanisms of power.²² He soberly considered the political calculations of the ruler as the single relevant basis for decisions.²³ The French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault defined political power as a relationship between diverse entities. Processes of education and learning enable the members of a society to establish a more

²² Niccolo Machiavelli, “Der Fuerst,” in *Niccolo Machiavelli, Vom Staate, Vom Fuersten, Kleine Schriften* (Hamburg: Nikol 2010), 411-422.

²³ Karlfriedrich Herb, “Machtfragen. Vier philosophische Antworten. Ueber Machiavelle, Hobbes, Arendt und Foucault,” *Die politische Meinung, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung*, no. 459 (February 2008): 69.

or less hierarchical assignment of roles and functions.²⁴ In this respect, power is a sociological and political term used to define relationships of superiority or dependence. It describes the capability of individuals, groups, structures, or organizations (for example, states to enforce their goals towards the opposition of a third party). Continuous power structures are able to coin social rules and regulations. Over time, societies accept this state as one legitimate exercise of power and rule, even if structures to prevent the abuse of power (for example, a system of checks and balances), do not exist.²⁵

Three Dimensions of Political Power

The political and social theorist Steven Lukes depicted the concept of three different dimensions of power to analyze its political impact.²⁶ The basis for his theory is the publications of the political scientists Robert Dahl,²⁷ Peter Bachrach, and Morton Baratz.²⁸ Dahl postulated that power as a phenomenon is always connected to existing conflicts between actors because of different interests. The one who performs power

²⁴ Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Writings, 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 78-84.

²⁵ Klaus Schubert and Martina Klein, *Das Politiklexikon* (Bonn: Dietz 2011), accessed 12 August 2014, <https://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/17812/macht>.

²⁶ Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 15-17.

²⁷ Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," in *Political Power. A Reader in Theory and Research*, eds., R. Bell, D. V. Edwards, and R. H. Wagner (New York: Free Press, 1969), 79-93.

²⁸ Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *The American Political Science Review* 56, no. 4 (December 1962): 947-952.

influences the decision of the one who is influenced. Therefore, the facet of the decision making process is the first significant source and indicator of political power.

Bachrach and Baratz added a second dimension of power. The introduced concept of the “Two Faces of Power”²⁹ describes the ability to anticipate necessary decisions. The political actor mobilizes influence to manipulate the decision making process in order to avoid having the dispute out in the open. On one hand, the ruler can attempt to mitigate demands of the opposition. On the other hand, further options are to deny legitimacy of a request or negative sanctions and the threat of force.³⁰ Therefore, the setting of the agenda is the specific quality of this second dimension of power. The common feature is the presence of a conflict situation.

In contrast, Steven Lukes delineated that power relations are also imaginable without any open or hidden conflict. Actually, the political leader shapes the concerns and interests of the ruled. The special focus is placed on the fact that the ruled one is not aware of the manipulation, but believes to act in his own best interest.³¹ Therefore, the latent conflict³² between the interest of manipulating and manipulated actor is the characteristic of the third dimension of power. This conception has the potential to lastingly affect the attitudes of planted individuals. Therefore, there are greater chances of success of structural change at the ruler’s discretion.

²⁹ Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 947-952.

³⁰ Anthony Giddens, *Die Konstitution der Gesellschaft. Grundzüge einer Theorie der Strukturierung* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1992), 66.

³¹ Lukes, 24-27.

³² Ibid., 27.

The Patterns of Individual Decision Making

This thesis does not primarily research the operational rationales of political actors, but the continuum of political development. However, it is crucial to state the science-based perspective of this thesis on patterns of individual action.

The Indian social scientist Vani K. Borooah, in his “Rational Actor Models in Political Science,” refuses the conception of a homo economicus who follows only one operational rational (for example, to be honest as long as it matches one’s own economic interests). He denies the idea of a single reason that drives a person’s actions.³³

The guidance to structure the patterns of individual decision-making is the epistemology of radical constructivism and the learning theory of the German psychologist Klaus Holzkamp. Following the idea of constructivism, an observing individual construes a recognized item by processing the act of cognition. According to constructivism, the core statement of radical constructivism is that an individual is unable to recognize an objective reality, because there is no common perception. An individual always constructs his own subjective interpretation of reality, based on his own sensory stimuli and memory.³⁴ This points to three major conclusions arise. First, an individual does not gather knowledge from the environment, but designs his own cognition in adaption and to organize the particular prism of that individuals experience. Second, truth or reality is only intersubjective as a process of negotiation between individuals; the

³³ Vani K. Borooah, “Rational Actor Models in Political Sciences,” International Centre for Economic Research, April 2012, 1, accessed 7 July 2014, <http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2002/borooah20-02.pdf>.

³⁴ Ernst von Glasersfeld, “Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit und der Begriff der Objektivität,” in *Einführung in den Konstruktivismus*, eds. Heinz Foerster and Ernst von Glasersfeld (Munich: Piper Publishing House, 1992), 6.

agreement on a common, a viable understanding. Third, radical constructivism designs no ethical system.³⁵ Instead, it determines that every individual is solely responsible for his thoughts and actions based on his individual prism of experience.

Building on this concept, Klaus Holzkamp's subject scientific learning theory depicts the relationship between an individual and environment. Learning, and that includes action, is an individual acting to develop a viable approach to infer the social environment and improve his quality of life.³⁶ The focus of the theory is to visualize, describe, and assess individual action in order to understand the subjective perspective. The outcome is the following conclusions. First, the individuals learns to gather and manage their area of influence; this is an adaptive and complexity reducing process. Second, an individual always has, from his point of view, good reasons for his thoughts and actions. These good reasons are the personal interests that motivate the individuals thoughts and actions. Third, learning cannot be initiated by others; it is the inaccessible decision of the subject. Individuals can only initiate learning for themselves, but not for somebody else.³⁷ From this, it follows that understanding a person's living environment is the base of understanding his actions.

Conclusion

The delineated concepts of power, their different but connected dimension, and the basal idea of the operational rationale of actors are the crucial foundation for a

³⁵ Von Glasersfeld, 335-336.

³⁶ Klaus Holzkamp, *Lernen–Subjektwissenschaftliche Grundlegung* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1995), 181.

³⁷ Ibid., 838.

methodologically structured comprehension of the collected information. The analysis of the actual situation in Egypt and the existing relations between individuals and actors is going to take place in light of the definition of power. For example, it is imperative to consider to what extent the enduring power structures of the Egyptian Armed Forces or the Muslim Brotherhood effectively formed the Egyptian political and social environment. Moreover, the dimensions of power open the opportunity to categorize political decisions and allow a substantial assessment of the prospects of success. Finally, the synopsis of radical constructivism and Holzkamp's learning theory facilitate a classification and understanding of the patterns of individual decision-making. The patterns of individual action may not be logical in an intersubjective way, but there is always an analytically comprehensible motive and an operational rationale of good reasons.

Research Design

Based on the preliminary works, the review of Egypt's historical development in the 20th and 21st centuries, is the initial point for further consideration of the consolidation of an Islamic republic, the rule of Hosni Mubarak, the Arabellion and its consequences to this day. The analysis is predicated on a characterization of the term power, its dimensions, and the individual's operational rationale, focused on politics, society, and economy in order to define general parameters of the situation in Egypt. This step facilitates the description of the new political framework and the current power constellations, the major actors and movements, their vital interests, conflicts, and prospects.

The consideration of the social and economic situation in Egypt completes this part of analysis and is simultaneously the foundation for the development of assumptions based on actual events. As said the thesis does not primarily research the operational rationales of political actors, but analyzes the continuum of political development in awareness of the existence of individual patterns of decision making. In this regard, the focus is on three facets: the future domestic situation in Egypt, the country's possible pioneer task for political and social change in the region, and the role as regional key player.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL REVIEW AND FRAMING THE ENVIRONMENT

A Short History of Egypt: From the Beginnings until the Eve of the Revolution

Today, with a population of more than 80 million,³⁸ Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world. The recorded history goes back more than 5,000 years. Once an ancient civilization, the Romans occupied Egypt around the beginning of the Common Era and marked the beginning of more than 2,000 years of foreign rule. In the seventh century, Arabs conquered the country, defeated the Eastern Roman Empire, and introduced Islam. In the aftermath, the dynasties of the Shi'ah Fatimids (originally Kurdish Ayyubid), and the sultanate of the military caste of the Mamluks ruled the country until the Ottoman conquest in the 16th century.³⁹

From the beginning of the Rule of the Ottoman Empire until the Modern Egyptian Monarchy

Following the Cambridge History of Egypt, the conquest of the country by the Ottoman Empire in 1517 marks the beginning of the modern period of the country; even though Egypt was then officially under Ottoman rule for more than three and a half centuries, only interrupted by the French invasion and the British counter-invasion between 1798 and 1807. For much of the period of nominal Ottoman Rule, the Egyptian province was semi-autonomous, because of the enduring influence and power of the

³⁸ World Health Organization, "Egypt," accessed 14 August 2014, <http://www.who.int/countries/egy/en/>.

³⁹ Denise Youngblood Coleman, ed., *Egypt Country Review 2014*, Countrywatch, 4, accessed 7 March 2014, www.countrywatch.com.

Mamluks.⁴⁰ Despite vast investments in the country's infrastructure in the 19th century, the construction of the Suez Canal, and the easing of feudal regulations, revenues were insufficient to return foreign investments. The increase of French and British exercise of control led to the anti-European Urabi revolt in 1879. After its defeat by the British in 1882 and officially still a province of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt became de facto a Crown Colony of the United Kingdom. British officers led and trained the country's armed forces. However, geo-political realities, as well as the realization that Egypt's economic problems would not be solved quickly, stated the reason that the ostensibly short term intervention became a 70-year chapter in foreign domination. Even after the British government issued the Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian Independence in 1922 to end the protectorate, the United Kingdom reserved its rights in matters concerning foreign relations, the military, communications, the Suez Canal and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.⁴¹

From 1922 until 1952, the semi-sovereign kingdom of Egypt marked the start of a more liberal political and social environment.⁴² The origins of this development relate to the British influence in the 19th century: The modernization of infrastructure, the establishment of a centralized bureaucracy, and, not least, the immigration of a dominant

⁴⁰ Martin W. Daly, ed., *The Cambridge History of Egypt–Volume 2–Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), xi.

⁴¹ Martin W. Daly, "The British Occupation, 1882-1922," in *The Cambridge History of Egypt–Volume 2–Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, ed. Martin Daly (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 239-240.

⁴² Marcel Colombe, *L'évolution de l'Égypte (1924-1950)* (Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve, 1951), 20-23.

population of European land owners and businessmen set the stage for Egypt's transformation in the 1920s. The country adopted British technology and models of authority and built up an administrative and political elite. The original Ottoman concept of broad political inclusion was gone. Therefore, from the same British influence arose the beginnings of oppositional movements. Intellectual, Muslim reformer, and fundamentalist groups came into existence and express their anti-elite and anti-European ideas.⁴³

In general, the Egyptian constitution followed the British system of a shared legislative power between king and parliament. However, the spread of pluralism and constitutionalism in the Egyptian monarchy could not hide the fact that it was an unstable and imperfect construct. On one hand, the pursuit of full independence and social-economic reforms created a broad spectrum of ideologies mentioned above, from Islamic fundamentalism to secular nationalism. On the other hand, the political participation of the society did not lead to a direct practice of political power because the elites still controlled the state institutions. In the politics of the day, the king's strong position allowed him to constrain and suppress popular movements and paralyze the democratic process.⁴⁴

⁴³ Ehud R. Toledano, "Social and Economic Change in the 'Long Nineteenth Century'," in *The Cambridge History of Egypt—Volume 2—Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, ed. Martin Daly (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 283-284.

⁴⁴ Selma Botman, "The Liberal Age," in *The Cambridge History of Egypt—Volume 2—Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, ed. Martin Daly (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 285-286.

In addition to the king, the major actors in the political process were still the United Kingdom, the popular and secular Wafd Party, and several other smaller parties. Moreover, there was an extra-parliamentary opposition, in particular the Young Egypt Party, several communist and women's associations, and the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the British influence continually manifested itself in both the administration of the Sudan and in recurring interventions in domestic politics. This exercise of British power facilitated a political climate dominated by the question of national independence. In this era, the Wafd Party was the largest and most important political organization and in opposition to the king. It represented large swaths of the population and its strong popular base was the result of a wide network of relationships across most social classes, throughout the country, and regardless of religious affiliation. Calling for full national independence, civil rights for men, and substantial consolidation of the constitutional division of powers, the party itself remained in non-democratic structures and opposed divergent political ideas within its following.⁴⁵

In contrast, the minority parties did not have much support in the population and mostly just represented the ideology and views of their leaders. The non-parliamentary Young Egypt Party represented the political spectrum of a nationalist, militarist, and socially conservative political movement. The major goal was to apply religious guidance in everyday life and create an Egyptian empire.

While the Young Egypt Party recruited its followers mainly in schools and universities of urban areas, the rival Muslim Brotherhood followed a more complex and

⁴⁵ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Wafd," accessed 27 September 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/633823/Wafd>.

sophisticated strategy.⁴⁶ In accordance with its self-concept, the Brotherhood was not only politically involved, but attempted to act in all areas of life. Following an ideology that Islam is an all-embracing concept and opposing the influence of Western culture, the Muslim Brotherhood began to play an active role in education, economy, and commerce. It provided jobs to the underprivileged, and became a visible part in both, rural and urban life. In particular, the world economic crisis of 1929 supported this strategy and strengthened the population's support for the Muslim Brotherhood. That is why this party, founded in 1928, became the most important Islamic movement during the Egyptian monarchy.

Symptomatic for all political actors, was their understanding of democracy as a vehicle to enforce their respective particular interests, but not a value in itself. This characteristic of the defective structure of Egyptian constitutionalism aggravated the domestic tensions fanned by both the anti-British propaganda of the Axis powers and the British de-facto reoccupation of Egypt in 1939. On one hand, these events fueled the nationalist movements. On the other hand, this ruined the public trust in the competency of the political system and questioned the existing semi-liberal order.⁴⁷

The outcome was the radicalization of all parties, greatly increased politically motivated violence and murder, the ban of organizations by the king, and a renouncement of decision making in accordance with the constitution. All political actors contributed to the destabilization of the country and no one was able to enforce a functional alternative

⁴⁶ Bernhard Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry Into Conflict and Prejudice* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1999), 148-149.

⁴⁷ Botman, 297-301, 308.

draft. The paralysis finally led to the coup d'état of Muhammad Nagib's and Gamal Abdel Nasser's Free Officers on 23 July 1952, the abolition of the constitutional monarchy, and the de facto inauguration of a military dictatorship. The heritage of this political overthrow had at least three enduring manifestations.

First, the two most powerful opponents, the Egyptian military and the Muslim Brotherhood came to the fore in the public arena. Second, the end of the semi-liberal order dismantled pluralism and social diversity. However, this dismantling did not erase the common memory for the ideas of pluralism and political participation, nor the self-image of Egypt as a nation.

One Republic of Egypt: Four Faces, Divergent Characteristics

Owing to the pressure of the Free Officers, led by Muhammad Nagib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, King Faruq abdicated on 23 July 1952. His six-month-old son Fu'ad II was enthroned and sent into Swiss exile. From the proclamation of the Republic of Egypt in 1953, to the beginning of the Arabellion, four presidents, all former highly decorated officers, shaped the political landscape of the country in four very specific ways.

President Nagib: the Forgotten One

Shortly after King Faruq had resigned, General Nagib, then the chairman of the Free Officers Revolution Command Council, became prime minister. After the proclamation of the republic in 1953, he became the first president. His deputy prime minister and minister of interior was Gamal Abdel Nasser. With the Revolution Command Council still holding the political power, Muhammad Nagib initiated the first Agrarian Reform Law, to redistribute the land to the people, the withdrawal of the

monarchic constitution, and the declaration of a three-year transitional military government. Nagib disagreed with the Council's majority decision to continue its government because it contradicted his plan to end military rule soon and transfer legal power to civilian authorities.⁴⁸ The conflict with Gamal Abdel Nasser and his facilitators of an army led government marked the first struggle for power and a preliminary decision on the direction of the young republic. In the end, President Nagib resigned in November 1954, succeeded by President Abdel Nasser who ushered in an era of ongoing military dominance in domestic politics.

President Abdel Nasser: the Founding Father

Despite the fact that Muhammad Nagib was the figurehead of the revolution in 1952 and he represented the desire to transfer power to civilian authorities, it is Gamal Abdel Nasser who takes credit for guiding the country into this modern age. During the demonstrations in Cairo in 2011, many protesters waved pictures of Abdel Nasser indicating the enduring popularity of his ideas of social justice and his model of government.⁴⁹

Actually, Gamal Abdel Nasser was a founding father for the country in many more ways than the protesters imagined. During his reign from 1954 to 1970, he established three principles that still influence contemporary Egyptian politics: Nasserist

⁴⁸ Nevine Khalil, "The Forgotten President," *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, no. 595 (18-24 July 2002), accessed 4 October 2014, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/595/sc6.htm>.

⁴⁹ Ahmed El-Tonsi, "The Legacy of Nasserism," *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, no. 1131 (17 January 2013), accessed 5 October 2014, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/1031/21/The-legacy-of-Nasserism.asp>.

Arab socialism, the preeminence of the military, and Pan-Arabism. Domestically, President Nasser pursued his own model of Arab socialism in order to achieve social justice as a prerequisite for a liberal and democratic society. He enforced land grants to peasants, women's suffrage, free education and medical treatment, and adequate jobs for all graduates.⁵⁰ In addition to an inefficient economy and horrendous public spending, the entrenchment of an one-party state led by the Arab Socialist Union was the major downside of Nasser's socialism. The abolition of the multi-party system contradicted democratic principles, fueled armed hostilities with the Muslim Brotherhood, and finally resulted in a continual state oppression of the Islamic opposition.

Regarding the composition of the government, it was a symbol for the distinguished role of the military in the political process. In addition to the president, most members of the cabinet were former or active officers. Moreover, the Arab Socialist Union descended from the Free Officers Movement of the revolution of 1952. On these grounds, President Nasser ensured both preeminence of the military and virtually no separation of powers. With regard to foreign affairs, the Egyptian Armed Forces emphasized their significance in particular to public opinion beyond the domestic political participation in two functions. On the one hand, there was Egypt's tense relationship to the United Kingdom and France and later to Israel that led to the Suez crisis in 1956 and the Six-Day War in 1967. On the other hand powerful forces supported

⁵⁰ Jan Claudius Voelkel and Ola Kubbara, "Dossier innerstaatliche Konflikte," *Aegypten*, Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung, 16 April 2014, accessed 5 October 2014, <http://www.bpb.de/internationales/weltweit/innerstaatliche-konflikte/182905/aegypten>.

Gamal Abdel Nasser's image as a controversial figure, man of action, and Arab mouthpiece.⁵¹

In this spirit, he developed his own variation of Pan-Arabism, the nationalist concept of Arabic cultural and political unity.⁵² Nasserism set a distinctive ideological foundation and empowered the president to pursue his political goals in foreign policies and to distract Egyptians from the domestic results of the socialist mismanagement. As a result, in 1956 Nasser took advantage from the bloc confrontation of the Cold War, was able to establish Egypt as the lead nation of the non-aligned countries, turn the military defeat in the Suez crisis into political victory, and play the United States against the Soviet Union to finance the new Aswan High Dam. Less successful was the temporary union with Syria and North Yemen from 1958 to 1961 which caused the deterioration of the relationship with the conservative Arab monarchies, in particular Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi-Arabia. Furthermore, Egypt's defeat in the Six-Day-War and the Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula tarnished the image of Pan-Arabism and Nasser's image as a figurehead. The public protest in the aftermath of the war forced President Nasser to remove several military members of his cabinet and hold a referendum concerning the reorganization of the Arab Socialist Union, extending independence of the legislation, and strengthening of civil rights.⁵³ President Nasser died in September 1970, having

⁵¹ John L. Esposito, "The Islamic Factor," in *Egypt at the Crossroads—Domestic Stability and Regional Role*, ed. Phebe Marr (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999), 48.

⁵² Encyclopedia Britannica, "Pan-Arabism," accessed 5 October 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/878838/Pan-Arabism>.

⁵³ Voelkel and Kubbara.

suffered a heart attack right after his personal mediation of a ceasefire between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

President As Sadat: the Daring Pragmatist

After the death of President Nasser and in accordance with the Egyptian constitution, Vice President Muhammad Anwar As Sadat became temporary head of state. He was a contemporary and had been a supporter of President Abdel Nasser since the foundation of the Free Officers Movement. He had held several offices, among them the secretary general of the Islamic congress, minister of state, and chairman of the national assembly. However, most of these positions used to be a ceremonial in function. Because of this, many supporters and adversaries initially underestimated As Sadat's political instinct and will for power.⁵⁴

As Sadat was very conscious of the country's political, economic, and in particular psychological situation. The ideology of Pan-Arabism, the Egyptian Armed Forces, and the Egyptian national pride had met their Waterloo in the Six-Day War against Israel in 1967. The economy and national budget suffered from the side effects of the government's socialist policies. Moreover, the one-state party seemed to be incapable of following up on the promise of more civil rights. Therefore, As Sadat strove for his

⁵⁴ Eric Pace, "Anwar el-Sadat, the Daring Arab Pioneer of Peace with Israel," *The New York Times*, 7 October 1981, accessed 5 October 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/1225.html>.

own and distinct legitimacy and initiated the Corrective Revolution in order to break with the traditions of Gamal Abdel Nasser.⁵⁵

Thereby President As Sadat's agenda pursued two greater goals. The first goal was the domestic aim to gain the support of the population and consolidate the gathered position of power. In this respect, President As Sadat started his first term with the demilitarization of his cabinet and appointed mainly civilian ministers. He also limited the authority of the secret police, gradually improved the freedom of the press, and strengthened the rule of law. Furthermore, he rehabilitated the oppressed Muslim Brotherhood, permitted the public and political participation of previously illegal Islamic organizations, and codified the Sharia as one source of jurisdiction in the constitution of 1971 in order to gain the support of these movements. After the Yom Kippur War in 1973 when Egypt finally ended the allegiance to the Soviet Union of the Nasser era, President As Sadat linked his new Western orientation with the attempt to pursue economic liberalization and internationalization. This step followed the concept to connect domestic and foreign policy goals whenever possible. The realignment of the economic policy served the intention of weakening the still existing oligarchies in the Egyptian society and fostering their own position.⁵⁶

Second, in foreign politics President As Sadat sought to restore the armed forces reputation and the national pride overall. Instead of political participation, he ordered a

⁵⁵ Esposito, 48-49; Encyclopedia Britannica, "Egypt–The Sadat Regime," accessed 6 October 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/180382/Egypt/22402/The-Sadat-regime>.

⁵⁶ John B. Altman, ed., *Sadat and His Legacy, Egypt and The World, 1977-1997* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for the Near East Policy, 1998), XII-XIII.

reform of the armed forces in order to achieve professionalization in warfare. After first attempts for a peaceful withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai Peninsula had failed, pressure on the Egyptian government increased. Hence, after Soviet reassurance, President As Sadat decided to risk an attack against Israel and end the political stalemate concerning the Sinai question.

The result of the decision of the Egyptian Armed Forces only to cross the Suez Canal, seize the far side and stay under the umbrella of its own air defense was a loss of momentum after the element of surprise had passed. Facing the massive Israeli counter-attack the country teetered on the brink of a defeat again. Despite this tactical and operational setbacks the war marked a strategic success and the onset of an increasing role in foreign affairs. The Israel Defense Forces lost their aura of invincibility and the Egyptian Armed Forces restored their reputation. The population interpreted the successful attack as a symbol for the president's great leadership.⁵⁷ In the end, the war brought in the United States as mediator in the now beginning negotiations between Egypt and Israel. Furthermore, President As Sadat achieved an outstanding international reputation as an audacious and reliable partner. With his visit to the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, and his offer of peace talks, the president initiated a new chapter in Arab-Israeli history. On the plus side, the peace treaty with Israel in 1979, the first one between Israel and an Arab country, returned control over the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and constituted a complex but basically robust relationship with the Jewish state. Furthermore, Egypt indicated its move towards the West and started developing strong relationships, in particular with the United States. Finally, the country's economy

⁵⁷ Altman, XII-XIII.

benefited from liberalization, the reopening of the Suez Canal, and not the least of which was the two billion dollars spent annually by the United States.⁵⁸

On the downside, the leaders of the neighboring Arab countries took this peace treaty as a sellout of the common cause and as a betrayal of the Muslim community. The former brother states suspended Egypt's seat in the Arab League, moved the headquarters from Cairo to Tunis, and imposed stiff economic sanctions. Egypt's role as a leader in the Arab world was gone. Domestically, a majority of the Egyptian population appreciated the peace treaty with Israel in light of the political and economic progress, but also saw the jeopardized vision of Arab unity. In addition, the government itself now had to suffer the consequences of political and social participation of the Islamic movements which had transformed during the last decade. All still had their ideology of Islam as an all-embracing concept in common. However, in part the movement still wanted to change society within the system and thus restored its ample social networks. On the other hand, new and more radical groups formed, believing that the Egyptian government and its president was anti-Islamic and had to be removed by any means necessary.⁵⁹ In the course of this radicalization, the president again decreed reprisals against the Islamic movements, but could not avert his assassination on 6 October 1981 by the fundamentalist Islamic faction Al Jihad.

⁵⁸ Phebe Marr, ed., *Egypt at the Crossroads—Domestic Stability and Regional Role* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1999), XVIII.

⁵⁹ Esposito, 49.

President Mubarak: the Preserving Pharaoh

When President Anwar as-Sadat was murdered, the Egyptian population had already been living in different forms of military oligarchy for almost 30 years. He was succeeded by Air Force General and then Vice President Hosni Mubarak, who was also injured in the assassination.

His first step was the immediate and forcible abatement of extremist riots that followed the assault. This modus operandi became characteristic of President Mubarak's policy whenever the power of the elites was at risk. He identified foreign policy, the armed forces, the economy, and the social structure as the major power sources and performed a permanent tightrope act to balance these sources over decades. In manifold ways, the governmental policy was a contradiction in terms to please every side and with the only objective to preserve its own predominance.

In terms of foreign policy, President Mubarak kept his predecessor's peace treaty with Israel and actually started cooperation to secure the shared border on the Sinai Peninsula and later the border to the Gaza Strip. However, he neither promoted these actions in the national or international public, nor did he communicate the advantages Egypt gained from the peace treaty itself. In fact and against Israeli interests, the president tried to moderate the concerns of the Palestinian side. Furthermore, while he was generally in contact with the Israeli government, Mubarak never visited the country himself.

On one hand, this dual track strategy offered the opportunity to keep and expand the growing relationship with the Western nations and take advantage in particular of US financial support. On the other hand, President Mubarak led his country gradually out of

the isolation in the Greater Middle East, restored Egypt's membership in the Arab League, as well as the arranged organization's headquarters return to Cairo in 1989. By the early 1990s, he had renewed Egypt's role as a leading power in the region and participated as one of the most important partners of the coalition in the Gulf War of 1991 to free Kuwait.⁶⁰

Aside from the country's geopolitical position, its number of inhabitants, and the size of its armed forces, it was mainly the skillful diplomacy that helped to promote Egypt's role as a reliable partner of the West, as a recognized mediator in the Arab League, and as an advocate for the Palestinian cause.⁶¹ This balancing act, which was not entirely supported by the population, was a characteristic of Mubarak's interest-driven politics. It did not only secure Egypt's position in the concert of powers, but stabilized its economic situation for decades due to continued military and financial support from the United States and Saudi Arabia.

In terms of domestic policy, Mubarak also followed his dual track strategy. On the credit side, he took action to stimulate the economy. The government invested in infrastructure projects, and in particular in the tourist industry. The foundation for the latter was the infrastructure Israel left behind when they departed the coastline of the Sinai Peninsula. Furthermore, the country restored broad funding of basic needs and made huge investments in the education and graduation of the youth.

⁶⁰ Marr, XIX.

⁶¹ Volker Perthes, *Geheime Gärten. Die neue arabische* (Bonn: Goldmann, 2006), 172.

On the downside, specifically the annual arrival of half a million new job-seeking youth, many with college diplomas, challenged President Mubarak's way of government. He had refined the neo-patrimonial⁶² impetus of the system of rule. These pork barrel politics were relics of the era of President Sadat as compensation for the exclusion of the military from the cabinet in the 1970s. In short and medium term perspectives, the system of patronage stabilized the power of the armed forces and the National Democratic Party (NDS), indeed; but in the long-term, this approach promoted corruption, stagnation, and excessive bureaucracy. Actually, the clientele policy blocked sustainable economic reforms that would have promoted general economic prosperity. Therefore, the growing lack of jobs for the well-educated, young population came along with an increasing lack of prospects that in turn undermined the economic basis of the system of patronage. This way of safeguarding power was accompanied by the imposition of a permanent state of emergency and emergency laws in order to indefinitely restrict the constitutional guarantee of basic rights such as freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly and freedom of the press; a setback from the concessions President Sadat had made in the 1970s.⁶³

Nevertheless, in everyday life the political landscape of Egypt was a conditioned pluralism within this authoritarian system. It saw jokes about the head of state,⁶⁴ periodic elections, opposition parties, room for debate, dissenting political and religious opinions, as well as quite an independent judiciary. The intent of this freedom was to silence

⁶² Model in which personalized and rational-bureaucratic rule are closely interlinked with each other. Patronage and favoritism are the basis but also the Achilles' heel of the intended system stabilization. Kraushaar, 158.

⁶³ Kraushaar, 158.

⁶⁴ Scholl-Latour, 199.

opposition, but in particular, the political Islam utilized the room for its own development. Both moderate and radical movements expanded with significant support from neighboring countries.⁶⁵

The Muslim Brotherhood, which was banned but tolerated, could pursue its political as well as social activities.⁶⁶ It enhanced its organizational structure, adopted governmental responsibilities like youth centers, day care, financial services, and of course spread its ideology. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood attracted the middle class and intellectuals and placed its ideas in the mainstream society. At the end of the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood was an integral part of the Egyptian society and able to participate in elections via forming of coalitions with recognized parties. The organization gave proof of their effectiveness after a fatal earthquake south of Cairo in October 1992 when its members responded faster to the consequences than the government officials.⁶⁷

Not only in this context the lack of prospects for the young adults without jobs and most still living at home were perfect breeding grounds for the spread of the moderate Muslim Brotherhood slogan “Islam is the solution.”⁶⁸ Moreover, the extremist movements Gamaa Islamiya, originally a movement of students believing in Islam as the perfect system, and Al Jihad, who wants to build an Islamic state, took their chance to

⁶⁵ For example Lybia, Saudia Arabia, Iran, Sudan.

⁶⁶ Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 185.

⁶⁷ Esposito, 52.

⁶⁸ Nicholas D. Christoph, “Is Islam the Problem?” *The New York Times*, 5 March 2011, accessed 17 November 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/opinion/06kristof.html>.

radicalize themselves and spread their ideology, offering young people hope, community and home.

Beginning in 1989 and in particular in the 1990s, the Mubarak Administration faced several waves of violence. The government's reaction followed the depicted modus operandi of perceiving a potential threat to its own monopoly of power and constraining all the freedoms of the previous years. This unspecific and indiscriminate approach targeted both moderate and radical Islamic movements. Acting under the permanent state of emergency the government used massive force, arrests without warrants, military courts, torture, and executions to oppress and intimidate the suspected terrorists. The Muslim Brotherhood was also affected. In addition to crackdowns and the shutdown of the movement's headquarters in Cairo, the government arrested dozens of potential candidates in the run up to the elections in 1995 and facilitated the unhindered reelection of President Mubarak.⁶⁹

In this respect, President Mubarak revealed a superficial sense of indifference of the population's mood, ignoring the fact that at least the Muslim Brotherhood was in the mainstream of Egyptian society. Unspecific attacks to fight the movement implied an attack against its own people. The government veered away from its own population. Moreover, without the effective possibility of political participation, people had the choice between giving up and radicalization.

⁶⁹ Sonja Hegasy, "Politisches System–Demokratisierung," *Bundeszentrale fuer politische Bildung, Informationen zur politischen Bildung*, no. 272 - *Ägyptens Weg in die Moderne* (20 May 2005), accessed 11 May 2014, <http://www.bpb.de/internationales/afrika/afrika/58998/beispiel-aegypten?p=all>.

It was not until 2004 that the political climate allowed major demonstrations against the Mubarak administration, though sometimes still oppressed by security forces. Although several candidates formally competed for the elections in 2005, President Mubarak's reelection was clear from the start. From 1981 to 2010, President Mubarak pursued his apparently successful approach of both foreign and domestic balancing in order to preserve the predominance of his rule.

For the first time it appeared in 2010 that the lack of political participation created a significant lack of situational awareness and understanding for the government. The parliamentary elections were massively manipulated to provide a majority for the National Democratic Party and even the tiniest element of competition was gone. Moreover, there were growing indications that President Mubarak attempted to implement his son Gamal Mubarak as dynastic successor. The public anger over the ignorance of the government erupted in some minor protest campaigns and strikes. However, overall there was more an air of apathy more than one of change. Even if there had been signals of change, the regime would have been unable to notice or channel any increasing pressure.⁷⁰

Preliminary Conclusion: a Common Sense of Rule

A retrospective of the form of government and the character of rule from the monarchy in 1923, to the directed republic on the eve of revolution, offers insights that are fundamental for the understanding of the dynamics of the two overthrows in 2011 and

⁷⁰ Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 51-53.

2013 and the self-conception of major actors. This preliminary conclusion highlights two major patterns that run like a common thread through the recent history of Egypt.

A Rule Based on the Division of Labor

Foucault defined political power as a relationship between entities and more or less with a hierarchical assignment of roles and functions. Following this definition, Egypt has a unique constellation and role assignment to exercise political power. There is an iterative cycle in the relationship between the government and parties or movements. Starting in the era of the kingdom, it looks like there is practical sharing of state functions. While the government was responsible for the general management of the state, foreign policies, security, and general decision making, the grand land owners exercised control over their peasants and took responsibility for the periphery of state control and in particular for the satisfaction of basic and social needs.⁷¹ The republic appeared to follow the same pattern, only the major stakeholders changed. While Presidents Nasser, As Sadat, and Mubarak controlled the overall management of the state, they also tried to utilize contemporary movements as intermediaries to coordinate and direct public life in accordance with the government's general guidance. President Nasser employed the new peasants after his land reform and the worker's elite in the city. Presidents As Sadat and Mubarak tried to utilize the networks of the major Islamic movements, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood.⁷² The respectively affiliated party of

⁷¹ Alain Roussillon, Republican Egypt: Revolution and Beyond.” in *The Cambridge History of Egypt–Volume 2–Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, ed. Martin Daly (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 390.

⁷² Ibid., 391.

the head of state and parliament served as a lever to enable the necessary information exchange. The insignificant opposition within these organizations was the essential line of communication for the government.

Thereby the relationship between the two protagonists always shifted in cycles of cooperation and confrontation. Phases of confrontation always appeared when the government assumed that the power of the elites was at risk. In the sunset of the Mubarak administration, the regime was caught in their own trap. The National Democratic Party failed as a lever because the government itself broke off the line of communication with a massive voter fraud in 2010.

Democracy as a Tool to Preserve Political Power

The second pattern is the continuity of how Egyptian presidents understood and exploited the concept of democracy. The intent of Muhammad Nagib, Egypt's first president, to immediately hand over the political power to a civil government, has been a singular event so far. Moreover, President Nagib lost office, reputation, and temporarily his freedom as a direct consequence of his political belief.

After his forced retirement, his successors established a perception and power structure valid at least until the eve of the Arabellion. The head of state and leader of the only relevant political party was always a former high-ranking officer of the Egyptian Armed Forces. The existing constitution, the parliament, and the periodic elections represented the formal separation of powers in a republican system. Actually, there were two purposes: the preservation of the system and in particular, its elite. Furthermore, the power structure should be capable of fulfilling the governmental requirements for the country in accordance with the guidance of the president. Abdication of power, as well as

changes of government based upon elections were not part of the depicted structure because that would allow unanticipated challenges to the statics of the power structure. The democratic elements in the Egyptian constitution have just two major functions. On one hand, they guaranteed a minimum of political controversy and a minimal level of participation that would not endanger the government. It was at once a medication to alleviate the symptoms of liberal ideas and a sensor for the government to ensure situational awareness. On the other hand, it constituted formal legitimacy. It is significant for the further analysis, if and how the Arabellion changed these mechanisms in the power relationship of the major protagonists in Egypt in order to answer the question, how does the Arabellion affect Egypt as a nation state?

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The Arabellion and the Uncertainty in the Aftermath of Revolution

Midan at-Tahrir: Market of Shared Interests

Liberation Square, which received its name after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952, has ever since been a frequent location of protest. Like no other place, it symbolized the clash between state authorities and the anger of the people.⁷³ It was the place, where in January and February 2011, three factors came together, which in their core and aside from many other social, political, and economic aspects, caused the momentum of the protest movement and illustrated the decisive difference between this protest movement and the demonstrations of the past years. The first factor is demographic development.⁷⁴ Egypt's population had increased from 30 million inhabitants in 1966 to more than 80 million in 2010. Almost two-thirds of the population was under 30. It was a problem in that the regime was no longer able to meet the demand for acceptable jobs particularly for the succeeding young generations.⁷⁵ The system of patronage had reached its limits and its limits began undermining the social equilibrium. University graduates were confronted with a permanent lack of opportunity of

⁷³ The Tahrir Square adjoins the main administration building of the Egyptian government and has repeatedly been the scene of protests.

⁷⁴ In this context, the French historian and anthropologist Emmanuel Todd developed a system of indicators which—based on the fact of an increasing literacy rate, a decreasing birth rate and endogamy—determines the potential for change in a society. Emanuel Todd, *Frei! Der arabische Frühling und was er für die Welt bedeutet* (Munich, Piper, 2011), 38-43.

⁷⁵ Kraushaar, 168-169.

employment commensurate with their education. Therefore the youth was excluded from building up a self-sustained future.

Moreover, this development coincided with the already depicted phase of weakness of the system of government of President Mubarak and its incapability to gain situational awareness. The parliamentary elections of 2000 had revealed the general discontent with the political situation in Egypt.⁷⁶ Sensing a need for change, Hosni Mubarak tried to install his son Gamal in an attempt of dynastic succession. For the first time, the head of state should not rely on the support of the military, but on “alliances with important entrepreneurial families and manager friends.”⁷⁷ Being a member of this still young economic oligarchy, Gamal Mubarak tried to present himself as a reformer. However, according to rumors his own profit had always been in the foreground.

The third factor was the military itself. Having been the pillar and defender of the regime up to that point, it perceived its own position—and here particularly, its economic sinecure—to be threatened by social pressure and even more directly by the planned dynastic transfer of power. In this respect, there was an extremely low willingness to accept a civilian as successor to the state’s highest office in 2011.⁷⁸ However, it was a combination of the factors mentioned, the coincidence of an overlap of interests and at

⁷⁶ Up to now, the parliamentary elections in 2000 have been the “freest” elections after electoral fraud at the ballot boxes had been massively restricted by court. As a result, Egypt’s ruling party, National Democratic Party was able to ensure its three-fourths majority only by collaborating with independent candidates. Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 191-192.

⁷⁷ Stephan Roll, “Länderporträt Ägypten,” in *Arabische Zeitenwende. Aufstand und Revolution in der arabischen*, Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2012), 159.

⁷⁸ Scholl-Latour, 165.

the same time highly different intentions that formed a temporary alliance of convenience that brought Hosni Mubarak to renounce his office in 2011. Any hope of dynastic succession was gone.

Progress and Setbacks on the Road to Legitimacy

The developments since 11 February 2011 highlighted the difficult and unsteady way of a still young civil society. The aim of ousting Hosni Mubarak was achieved. Initially, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, chaired by Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, took the reins of power. The first formal steps towards a legitimized order were taken, particularly with the parliamentary elections between the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012, the lifting of the state of emergency after almost 31 years, the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, and the election of Mohammed Morsi as president of Egypt in June 2012, followed by the unchallenged dismissal of Field Marshal Tantawi in August 2012.

In the interim, the young protesters of Midan at-Tahrir saw themselves as the losers, because neither has there been an improvement in their economic situation, nor have they succeeded in having their political interests represented in the parliaments.⁷⁹ Instead, the majority of the population voted for the Democratic Alliance for Egypt headed by the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and including the Salafist Al Nour Party.⁸⁰ With Mohammed Morsi's election in June 2012, a former

⁷⁹ Gil Yaron, "Nicht mehr euphorisch," 10 February 2012, accessed 16 November 2014, <http://www.info-middle-east.com/news/nicht-mehr-euphorisch.html>.

⁸⁰ Allocation of seats in the "Majlis al-Shaab," the Egyptian House of Representatives: Democratic Alliance led by the Freedom and Justice Party (Muslim Brothers): approximately 45 percent; Al Nour Party (Salafiyya): approximately 25

official of the Muslim Brotherhood became president. Temporarily, the legitimacy of the parliament was questioned as the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the elections were unconstitutional. The legislature was formally dissolved by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on 15 June 2012, but then reinstalled by the newly elected president per decree.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Governmental Responsibility

The Muslim Brotherhood used tried and true methods on their road to institutional power. While the people in Cairo demonstrated against Hosni Mubarak and while intellectuals discussed their visions of Egypt's future, the Muslim Brothers acted as discretely but visibly as they had done in all those years of semi-legality. With the help of their widely dispersed network put in place over the years, they had taken on social service responsibilities and provided relief where the government had failed.⁸¹ The result was their integration in the Egyptian society. The ideology of the movement became mainstream. Consequently, they had reserved their position in the future Egypt long before the overthrow. From the beginning of political competition after the Arabellion, the Muslim Brotherhood organized itself into the Freedom and Justice Party, gave up its

percent; New Wafd Party (liberals) and Egyptian Bloc (leftist): each approximately eight percent; successors of former ruling parties: approximately 3.5 percent; independent and other parties: approximately eight percent. From the partial elections for the "Shura Council," the Egyptian upper house, the parties of the Muslim Brothers and the Salafiyya grouping emerged as largest parties in the council. Wikipedia, "Parliamentary Elections in Egypt," 28 October 2012, accessed 11 May 2014, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parlamentswahlen_in_%C3%84gypten_2011/2012.

⁸¹ Scholl-Latour, 176.

initial restraint in the upheaval process, and converted its meaningful position in the old regime into political capital.

The Muslim Brotherhood's victories in the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012 highlighted the marginal standing the liberal opposition possessed at that time. As to the agenda, the Muslim Brotherhood started to present itself to be moderately Islamic and in its core conservatively democratic.⁸² The government responsibility implied a general change in perspective. Out of its position of strength, the Muslim Brotherhood had to meet three challenges. On one hand, it was essential to keep the diverse movement together, to overcome the elder generation and the entrenched leadership,⁸³ to define its core messages and to develop a clearly defined profile—even at the price of split-offs—in order to gain capacity to both act and to compromise in the political competition. On the other hand, it faced the confusing phase of adjusting to a majority and presidential party responsible for making extensive decisions and bearing the consequences. Finally, the administration and the Muslim Brotherhood's representatives in the parliament had to negotiate with the unaffected powerful armed forces and security agencies. This required finding answers to questions which had so far been beyond the imagination of the Muslim Brotherhood and which had an effect on content-related aspects of its self-conception such as foreign, financial, and economic policy. In particular, foreign policy and the international community did not stop over because of a change of government in Egypt. Although inexperienced, the Muslim

⁸² Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 72.

⁸³ Ibid., 73. With regard to the age structure of the Muslim Brothers, Volker Perthes speaks of a twin of Husni Mubarak's former ruling party.

Brotherhood had to operate in the confined and shallow waters of foreign policy. In particular, the neighbor countries expected concise political statements and a relevant contribution. Furthermore, the relationship with the military, as well as the possibility of forming a coalition with secular or fundamentalist forces,⁸⁴ included basic decisions as to the course of the Muslim Brotherhood. It implied also the potential threat of losing the acceptance of the majority of the population and the position in power that it had gained only recently.

Nevertheless, it seemed to be a promising start to the new government. When President Mohamed Morsi took office on 30 June 2012, observers complimented the fair voting process and saw a good chance for a positive end to the rocky transition period. The new government got wide international recognition. Altogether, Morsi's first steps seemed to be directed towards a pragmatic approach involving relevant actors of the military leadership as well as of the Islamic block. For instance, the dismissal of Field Marshall Tantawi obviously happened with the approval of the military leadership. Moreover, there were sporadic signals of cooperation with the Islamic Bloc in the Constituent Assembly.⁸⁵ Another indicator of initial pragmatism was the relationship to Israel. While the sympathies of the Muslim Brotherhood for the Palestinians were without question, President Morsi maintained the peace treaty with Israel despite all contrary public rhetoric.

⁸⁴ Michael Lange, "Quo vadis Ägypten?: ein Jahr demokratischer Aufbruch in Ägypten," *Die politische Meinung: Monatszeitschrift zu Fragen der Zeit* 57, no. 508 (2012): 29.

⁸⁵ Martin Gehlen, "Ägypten streitet über Scharia-Klausel für Frauen," *De Zeit*, 8 October 2012, accessed 15 July 2014, www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2012-10/Aegypten-Frauenrechte-Verfassung.

To this extent, the dramatic decline of the government's reputation was against common expectation. By November 2012, there were growing indications that the Muslim Brotherhood had ended its balancing policy. In fact, the pragmatic approach served as a tool to consolidate the power base for more profound action. The major turning point was the activity of the constitutional assembly. Elected by the members of the parliament in June 2012, it mirrored its majority situation. Consequently, there was a broad majority of the parties that represented the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafiyya, but an underrepresentation of relevant social groups like women, Copts, or Bedouins. Liberal and secular members criticized the religious reference to the Islamic Shari'ah law and the powerful role of the scholars of the Al-Azhar University, who must be consulted in all relevant matters. Moreover, there was a lack of freedom of press, equality of men and women was limited to the statements of the Shari'ah, and overall the wording of several articles was airy, imprecise, and open to wide interpretation.⁸⁶ Otherwise, the draft left the powerful position of the armed forces almost untouched. First indicators appeared that the temporary gentleman's agreement between the Muslim Brotherhood and the elites started to dissolve; especially the increased investigations of the Supreme Court in the context of the constitutional assembly pointed to growing disagreement.

While the country had faced continuous demonstrations since President Morsi's election, his decrees to anticipate dissolution of the constitutional assembly because of a potential decision of the Supreme Court aroused massive protests. Furthermore, the president granted himself absolute powers until the proclamation of the new

⁸⁶ Nariman Youssef, "Egypt's Draft Constitution Translated," Egypt Independent, 2 December 2012, accessed 7 August 2014, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated>.

constitution.⁸⁷ Despite the ongoing protests and abrasive criticism, the assembly approved the draft constitution on 29 November 2012. After it passed a referendum with a turnout of 33 percent, the president signed it into law, replacing the constitution of 1971 and the provisional Constitution of 2011.

The next six months revealed the profound divisions within the Egyptian society and its institutions. Cairo again became the center of violent demonstrations of the government's supporters and adversaries. The president himself faced an ongoing conflict with the Supreme Court about the legitimacy of the next parliamentary elections. In March 2013, the court refused to approve planned elections the next April, because the electoral law might violate the constitution and alienate the opposition. Furthermore, Morsi seemed to be unable to meet the people's basic needs that were challenged by the aggravating economic crisis. In fact, with taking, office President Morsi failed to promote needed economic reforms and the necessary security environment.⁸⁸

While the president reorganized his cabinet and appointed an additional three ministers who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, a new secular opposition movement arose. The Tamarod, the rebellion movement, started a signature campaign to force President Morsi to resign. The movement was supported by several opposition parties like the National Salvation Front and the April 6 Youth Movement. Subsequently, the Supreme Court denied the legitimacy of the constitution and the Shura Council, which

⁸⁷ Egypt Independent, "Morsy Issues New Constitutional Declaration," 22 November 2012, accessed 10 October 2014, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/morsy-issues-new-constitutional-declaration>.

⁸⁸ IHS Jane's, "Executive Summary, Egypt," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – North Africa, Executive Summary*, 28 December 2013, IHS Global Limited, 2014, article #4, 11.

was the upper house of the Egyptian parliament that was dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood.

After the president appointed 16 new provincial governors, seven with a Muslim Brotherhood background, one a former member of the defunct terror organization Gamaa Islamiya, violence on the open road escalated. On 23 June 2013, the armed forces threatened to intervene if the unrest did not stop. On 1 July, President Morsi refused an ultimatum of the Tamarod Movement to retire. At the same time, the armed forces threatened to take action, if the president was unable to solve the crisis within the next 48 hours. On 3 July 2013 the military, led by General Abdel Fattah El Sisi, seized power, ousted and arrested President Morsi, suspended the constitution, and appointed President of the Supreme Court Adli Masur as temporary president.⁸⁹

Now, two and a half years after protesters at Tahrir Square had demanded Hosni Mubarak step down from office, Egypt's future order was in question again. With the election of the Muslim Brotherhood, the population had decided to transfer government responsibilities to a movement that had been established within the society for decades and thus decided against a radical new beginning under the leadership of the liberal movements. While it seemed in the beginning that the Morsi government had sought a cooperative arrangement with the military and therefore accepted limitations to the reform process, it soon became clear that Morsi promoted a profound Islamic orientation with a constitution linked to the principles of the Shari'ah. Moreover, the president directed the Muslim Brotherhood's attempt to percolate the state institutions to back up

⁸⁹ Jeremy M. Sharp, *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Service Report RL33003 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 2014), 3.

the legally acquired power. Only the ministry of justice and the security agencies eluded that onslaught, a prerequisite for the armed forces to preserve their power base.

On the other hand, President Morsi's approach to consolidating and maintaining power was just a reflection of the one Egyptian elites and the armed forces employed for the last six decades. It was this continuation of a pattern of political action in the country, but this time executed by a new Islamist protagonist.⁹⁰ Moreover, the so-called opposition was unable to enforce their political concepts within the existing constitution. The population elected the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi in free elections and by choice. The intervention of the military depicted the collective failure of all relevant actors to conform to the laws of the game named democracy and to negotiate sustainable solutions. In turn, the violent public protests manifested the division of the society. It illustrates the clash of very contrary political and social points of view. And last but not least, these differences and a strongly contrasting unwillingness to compromise led into the dead end.

Finally, the military used its wide range of power again and reverted to its traditional role as the guarantor of the country's stability to overthrow the civil government. The manipulating influence of the military and the old elites cannot be underestimated. The vigor of the opposition toward the end of the Morsi administration cannot be thought of without suspecting at least the silent agreement of the armed forces. In fact, there was an alliance of the armed forces, judiciary, economic elites, and the

⁹⁰ Nagwan El Ashwal, "Egypt on the Brink of Ungovernability," German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 19 February 2013, accessed 10 October 2014, <http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/kurz-gesagt/point-of-view-egypt-on-the-brink-of-ungovernability.html>.

security establishment. Pope Tawadros II, the Coptic patriarch, Grand Imam Ahmed Tayeb, President of Al Azhar University, the Tamarod Movement, the National Salvation Front, and even the Salafist Al Nour Party welcomed the coup d'état.⁹¹

Consequently, the first democratically elected government failed because of a highly complex aggregate of reasons. The enduring power of the elites met an inexperienced and quite incompetent new government, self-serving interests of relevant actors, the manipulation of the public, and a lack of democratic culture.

Just a Reset? The “Second Revolution” and the Rocky Road to Legitimacy

The armed forces labelled the overthrow as a “Second Revolution.”⁹² The face of the coup was Chief of Military Council General Abdel Fattah El Sisi. He justified the step by citing the increasing dissatisfaction of the people because of the obvious political and economic grievances. Moreover, the Military Council accused President Morsi of having a hidden agenda supporting terrorist activities in the Sinai Peninsula. In turn, the followers of the toppled President Morsi accused the Military Council of being rebels, who overthrew a legitimate administration in order to reestablish the former regime.

In a televised address on 3 July 2013, General El Sisi underlined that the armed forces could not sit back in the crisis, but that they had no interests in holding power

⁹¹ “Army Overthrows President Mursi,” Deutsche Welle, 3 July 2013, accessed 10 October 2014, <http://www.dw.de/milit%C3%A4r-st%C3%BCrzt-pr%C3%A4sident-mursi/a-16928214>.

⁹² Ashraf Khalil, “Cairo Protesters Demand New Egyptian Revolution,” *Time*, 30 June 2013, accessed 17 November 2014, <http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/cairo-protestors-demand-new-egyptian-revolution/>.

either. Moreover, he outlined a road map negotiated between the military and political representatives in order to establish a civil order again.⁹³

The Run for Legitimacy

The period from this address to the swearing-in ceremony of a new head of state a year later was mainly characterized by four facets that constituted the current situation in Egypt. First, although the Military Council was the active power in the overthrow its representatives were very concerned to demonstrate a maximum of legitimacy in their actions. Besides the wording of a “Second revolution”⁹⁴ in order to tie it in with the Revolution of 2011, General El Sisi was flanked by the country’s clerics and a wide spectrum of well-known political leaders, like the Nobel-prize winner and icon of the National Salvation Front Mohamed ElBaradei and the ultraconservative Islamist Galal Morra.⁹⁵ Thereby he highlighted once again the message the armed forces had propagated for over 60 years: We are the guardian of the nation and we just want to right the ship of state for the upcoming civilian authorities. In this way, the Military Council’s call for legitimacy was just to oust President Morsi and not as a mandate for temporary military rule. The immediate appointment of the temporary government led by the President of the Supreme Court Adli Mansour should mark the end of political action taken by the armed forces. Even though the use of military force for the overthrow served

⁹³ David D. Kirkpatrick, “Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi Is Taken Into Military Custody,” *The New York Times*, 3 July 2013, accessed 11 October 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html?pagewanted=all>.

⁹⁴ Ashraf Khalil.

⁹⁵ Kirkpatrick, “Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi Is Taken Into Military Custody.”

to suppress a possible backlash, the attempt to avoid the impression of a coup d'état was quite successful and became apparent in the hesitant reactions and appeals of the international community. Domestically, General El Sisi was able to form a wide spread alliance against the governing Muslim Brotherhood and gained legitimacy and the approval of the bigger part of the people to end the unsuccessful era of President Morsi.

The Government of Technocrats

The international and domestic acceptance or at least tolerance of the coup was a major prerequisite to taking the first steps on the road map. The second facet was the immediate appointment of the Government of Technocrats to run state affairs and set the conditions for a new constitutional process and further elections. Only four days after his inauguration, Adli Mansour published a Constitutional Declaration that delineated the framework until the end of the year. A committee of 10 jurists should develop a new draft based on the currently suspended constitution of 2012 within a month. The draft would then be reviewed by a panel of 50 representatives of Egyptian society within a timeframe of another two months. A month after that, the electorate would vote on the final draft.⁹⁶ Furthermore, the declaration recommended parliamentary elections in spring and presidential elections in summer of 2014. Superficially, the proposed schedule was a demonstration of the temporary government's capacity to act. On the other hand, it was an indicator that the replacement of the government was not a spontaneous reaction, but followed a careful plan. Furthermore, without consulting other political representatives,

⁹⁶ David D. Kirkpatrick, "Egypt Leader's Transition Plan Meets With Swift Criticism," *The New York Times*, 9 July 2013, accessed 11 October 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/world/middleeast/egypt-elections.html?pagewanted=all>.

interim President Mansour released the composition of the new cabinet, another signal of a change in the political power structure. While the administration included members of the Coptic Church, women, and most of the opposition parties, the Muslim Brotherhood was excluded. In addition, General El Sisi became deputy prime minister, minister of defense, and therefore the military strong point in the new administration.⁹⁷ Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi was both a respected economist and a representative of the old elites of the former Mubarak regime.

The Escalation of State-Violence

The third facet that associated with the transition period up to July 2014 was a massive increase of violence. The protests that followers and opponents of President Morsi started right after his replacement proceeded peacefully. People assembled in pro- and anti-Morsi camps blocking squares throughout Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood demanded repeatedly the release of Mohammed Morsi and the reinstatement of his administration. The date 8 July 2013 marked the first of a series of bloody clashes between the state security forces, and in particular, followers of the Muslim Brotherhood. When the protesters occupied an area belonging to facilities of the Republican Guards in Cairo, the assumed whereabouts of Mohamed Morsi, armed forces cleared the area and killed more than 50 people. There was credible evidence that the forces opened fire first on the peaceful demonstrators.⁹⁸ Over the next six months, it became evident that the

⁹⁷ Kareem Fahim, "Egypt Leader's Transition Plan Meets With Swift Criticism," *The New York Times*, 9 July 2013, accessed 11 October 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/world/middleeast/egypt-elections.html?pagewanted=all>.

⁹⁸ Ben Hubbard and Kareem Fahim, "Bloody Day in Unrest Widens the Rupture Among Ordinary Egyptians," *The New York Times*, 8 July 2013, accessed 12 November

interim government and the armed forces not only wanted to suppress the opposition's role in the new constitutional process, but use force to erase any noteworthy protest.

The interim government declared a state of emergency, restricted the freedom of assembly, and started an extensive media campaign to present its so-called fight against terrorism. This approach included directed clashes of security forces with pro-Mursi protesters. Hundreds of protesters were killed. In particular, the clashes on the Rabaa Al Adawya Square in Cairo on 14 August 2013, was a bloodshed with more than 600 people dead and approximately 4,000 injured.⁹⁹ After the news about the crackdown became known, there was only a little more protest in Egypt. On one hand, the opposition feared more bloodshed. On the other hand, the official media campaign made an important impact on the population. Interim Vice President Mohamed ElBaradei condemned the security forces and resigned. Within weeks, he moved to Vienna, Austria still in dissent with the government. Western governments, especially the United States and the European Union criticized the use of force by the Egyptian administration and restricted their military support in part. However, their further calls for a peaceful solution pointed out that they would take the winner's side despite all criticism.¹⁰⁰ In turn, the rulers in Cairo underscored that neither protesters and opposition, nor Western critique or sanctions could stop the implementation of the Constitutional Declaration.

2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/world/middleeast/bloody-day-in-unrest-deepens-rupture-among-ordinary-egyptians.html?pagewanted=all>.

⁹⁹ David D. Kirkpatrick, "Hundreds Die as Egyptian Forces Attack Islamist Protesters," *The New York Times*, 14 August 2013, accessed 11 October 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/world/middleeast/egypt.html?pagewanted=all>.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

The De-legitimization of the Muslim Brotherhood

The final facet of the transition phase was the gradual but extensive and ruthless approach of the government to delegitimize in particular the Muslim Brotherhood and disconnect the organization from all areas of life in Egypt. The security forces bloodily suppressed their protests, killed hundreds, and arrested thousands of their followers. The Cairo Court for Urgent Matters banned the organization in September 2013 and confiscated all their assets. The state began to take over schools and social welfare organizations, and dry up the financial networks of the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁰¹ The Freedom and Justice Party was finally banned and dissolved in August 2014. Furthermore, the former president Mohamed Morsi was accused of incitement to murder protesters, participation in an attempted coup, treason, and espionage. The trials are still ongoing, but highlighted the intent of the power holders to silence the Muslim Brotherhood and its major representatives. Mohamed Mursi was locked in a sound-proof cage while participating in his own trial. Moreover, the government's actions underscore the new quality of all-embracing suppression against the opposition. The periodic obstruction of the Muslim Brotherhood is a part of Egypt's history. However, this was the first attempt of the ruling party to eradicate the organization. It marked a shift in paradigm and the end of the rule based on a division of labor, where a semi-legal Muslim Brotherhood assumed responsibility for social welfare in the country.

¹⁰¹ IHS Jane's, "Executive Summary, Egypt," article #4, 12.

Conclusion

The depicted facets were the major factors of influence during the transition phase from the replacement of Mohamed Morsi to the inauguration of a new head of state. The Constitutional Declaration was only implemented in part. The responsible committee published the new draft of the constitution as planned. More than 98 percent of the voters approved the new constitution in January 2014. The turnout was only about 38 percent. The supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood boycotted the referendum and the government had started a campaign of arrests ahead of the referendum.¹⁰² Right after the referendum, interim President Mansour declared a major change in the road map. Contrary to the Constitutional Declaration, he announced that the people would vote for a new president, and after that, the parliamentary elections would take place. In March 2014, General El Sisi resigned from the army and the office of the minister of defense in order to be an eligible candidate for the presidential chair.¹⁰³ The presidential elections occurred between 26 and 28 May 2014. Candidate El Sisi won a landslide victory. Official numbers show he won 95 percent of the votes with a turnout about 47 percent. The European Union observer stated there was a lack of constitutional rights of association and expression. Moreover, the vote itself was in principle free but not fair, because of the overwhelming resources and the indirect governmental support for the former minister of

¹⁰² David D. Kirkpatrick, "Overwhelming Vote for Egypt's Constitution Raises Concern," *The New York Times*, 18 August 2014, accessed 11 October 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/world/middleeast/vote-validates-egypts-constitution-and-military-takeover>.

¹⁰³ Astrid Frefel, "Erst der Präsident, dann das Parlament," *Der Tagesspiegel*, 27 January 2014, accessed 7 May 2014, <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/erst-der-praesident-dann-das-parlament/9386900.html>.

defense.¹⁰⁴ The inauguration of the sixth President of the Republic of Egypt, Abdel Fattah El Sisi on 8 June 2014, marked an important intermediate step in the constitutional process. Despite the Constitutional Declaration, it is still an open process due to the lack of parliamentary elections. Repeatedly postponed, the missing parliament indicates the significant power shift to the new president and his fellowship.

The depicted components highlight that the transition phase to a new head of state was both a reset and a Second Revolution. The reset is manifest in the fact that the armed forces and the elites of the former Mubarak regime were able to restore their access to all state-owned institutions and offices. The legitimacy of the new government is not seriously questioned, neither domestically nor by the international community. Contrary to the official understanding of the Second Revolution, the revolutionary act was the brutal attempt to totally de-legitimize and marginalize the Muslim Brotherhood. The idea of preventing a polarization of the society through total destruction of an opponent with a virtual social function will create a change in the power and social structure of the society itself. The following analysis of the Constitution of 2014 and the major protagonists will deliver insights to Egypt's present power structure.

The Political Framework: The Constitution of 2014

The Egyptian constitution is an amendment to its earlier constitutions issued in 1971 and 2012. The draft was developed by a committee of 50 experts appointed by interim President Mansour. The constitution was approved by a public referendum on 15

¹⁰⁴ Kirkpatrick, "International Observers Find Egypt's Presidential Election Fell Short of Standards."

January 2014. It consists of a preamble and 247 articles in six major parts. The analysis will focus on major aspects and changes relevant to the topic of the thesis.¹⁰⁵

The Preamble

The text preludes with many references to the rich history of the country and the bonds to the three Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christendom, and Islam. Furthermore, the preamble proclaims three core messages. First, Egypt is a proud and indivisible country on its way to a better future. Second, Egypt is a democratic state with the principles of the Shari'ah as the principal source of legislation and with respect to Universal Human Rights. Third, the text highlights that the current process accomplishes the revolution of 25 January 2011 to 30 June 2012. Furthermore, the constitution is in the tradition of the revolutions of 1919, the independence from the British protection, and 1952, the “revolution” of the Free Officers Movement.¹⁰⁶

Altogether, the preamble is a plea for the national identity and the attempt to balance the relation of state and religion. The attempt to balance the relation between state and religion depicts that the Western school of thought is the basis for this constitution. A comprehension in the tradition of Islam as an all-embracing way of life does not know a division between state and religion. Moreover, the design of a tradition of respectable revolutions and the link to the current constitution facilitates both

¹⁰⁵ Republic of Egypt, *Constitution of The Arab Republic of Egypt 2014*, unofficial translation, Egypt State Information Service, 2014, accessed 10 October 2014, <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., preamble.

legitimacy for the current process and defamation of the administration of the former President Morsi.

The State, Components of Society and Public Rights

Egypt defines its political system as Arab democratic republic. One of its major pillars is the self-conception of the social and solidary community. The outcome is a broad variety of social rights in the constitution. Beyond that, the text highlights values like human dignity, personal freedom and safety, and freedom of thought and opinion. According to the wording, this part of the constitution generally meets democratic standards. A major change to the former constitution is the limitation of the role of the Shari'ah principles. The requirement that lawmakers had to consult the representatives of the Al-Azhar University was abolished. Moreover, religious parties are banned. The article that made the insult of the prophet a crime was removed, too. Furthermore, the constitution now bans trafficking, torture, guarantees freedom of belief, freedom of practicing any Abrahamic religion, and the equality of man and woman.¹⁰⁷

The self-definition as an Arab state, as well as the social rights iterates the idea of a social community. Moreover, it is a binding promise to the population to take care for the general good. The citizen rights like the dignity of the human being, equality before the law, and freedom of belief are a logical consequence. The limitation that the constitution only permits the practice of Abrahamic religions is both a constraint in comparison with the Western understanding of religious freedom and progressive to other countries with the self-identity of an Arab state. Merely the ban of religious parties is an

¹⁰⁷ Republic of Egypt, *Constitution of The Arab Republic of Egypt 2014*, articles 7-26; 51-93.

obvious attempt to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood from future political participation.

Overall, the social and public rights are a first indicator, that the content of the constitution is not any more a tool that legitimates oppression of the people.

Separation of Powers and Political Participation

The constitution follows respective the judiciary, the president and the parliament the concept of the division of power; in particular it abolished the mentioned competences of the Al-Azhar University influence on the process of legislation,. By definition, the courts are independent, the relation of legislative, and head of state are similar to other presidential systems. Both are elected by the people, both control the government and have the right to dismiss it, and both can draft bills. The parliament is the house of representatives and in general responsible for the budget, law making, and amendments to the constitution. Furthermore, it can initiate a lawsuit against the president with a two-thirds majority or can initiate a referendum to dismiss the president with an absolute majority.¹⁰⁸ In turn, the president is limited to two terms of four years, assigns the prime minister with the parliament's approval, and represents the country. He is supreme commander of the armed forces, but cannot declare war or the state of emergency without approval of the parliament. The possibility to declare the state of emergency is limited to a three-month period; the article also mentions the possibility of a singular extension of this state, but prohibits any attempts to dissolve the House of Representatives. Only in the case that the parliament is not elected, is the cabinet

¹⁰⁸ Republic of Egypt, *Constitution of The Arab Republic of Egypt 2014*, articles 101-138.

responsible for approval. Finally, the constitution permits the delegation of presidential powers to members of the cabinet or the governors.¹⁰⁹

The evident and intended lacks in the division of power are in the structure of the government itself. First, the minister of defense is the commander in chief, is always an officer, and is appointed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces for the next two presidential terms. The National Defense Council, not parliament, controls the budget of the armed forces. Members of this council are the president, the prime minister, the speaker of the parliament, the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, finance, and interior, as well as the heads of the forces and intelligence services.

In summary, the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances is similar to other democratic constitutions. In particular, the restrictions for the president to dissolve the parliament and to declare a state of emergency are progress, as well as the right of the parliament to initiate the dismissal of the president. The lack of democracy is evident in the context of the armed forces, and in particular shield the position of the minister and the budget from legislative control. Insofar the constitution now secures the in the preamble depicted special position of Armed Forces' as guardian of the nation.

Conclusion

The Constitution of 2014 has four major intents. It conjures the idea of a nation in unity and built its own legitimacy while discrediting the former administration. On the one hand, the constitution offers significant individual rights and abandons its former role as a mere tool to suppress the people. Otherwise, it bans a specific and integrated part of

¹⁰⁹ Republic of Egypt, *Constitution of The Arab Republic of Egypt 2014*, articles 139-162.

the society, the Muslim Brotherhood, from political participation. Finally, it offers significant progress in terms of separation of powers, but shields the role of the armed forces' special position out of the legislative process.

The criticism of the Zaid al-Ali, a legal scholar in Cairo at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, is inaccurate when he denies any progress.¹¹⁰ On the contrary, the constitution itself is a consistent, but not perfect approach for democratic evolvement. The genuine weakness of this constitution is that it is not filled with life so far. The violent actions of the security forces against protesters after the enactment of the constitution foiled the promise of individual rights. Furthermore, the constitutionally ordered parliamentary elections within six months after its approval did not take place so far. A constitution is always a framework and always a matter of interpretation. Therefore, at this point of time the problems are not the flaws in the articles who allow to sideline the law, ban the Muslim Brotherhood, or the special role of the military. It is the current antagonism between wording and action. This constitution has the composition to be an important source of power; whether for better or for worse depends on both the major protagonists and the will to really enact the constitution and follow the rules of the game named democracy.

The Relevant Political Protagonists and the Power Constellation Today

In particular, in the aftermath of the Arabellion, the public opinion in Western countries debated repeatedly the perspective of a political power struggle between

¹¹⁰ David D. Kirkpatrick, "Egypt's Crackdown Belies Constitution as It Nears Approval," *The New York Times*, 16 January 2014, accessed 8 October 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/17/world/middleeast/egypt-constitution-nears-passage-as-authorities-step-up-crackdown-.html?_r=0.

proponents and opponents of democracy and a new political freedom. Actually, all Egyptian politically relevant parties showed a lack in understanding and applying the concept of negotiating and compromise in order to avert a political crisis in Egypt. In fact, the self-immolation of the fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia in December 2010 indicates that the origin of the protest was not a question of identity about the political orientation of the country, but a question of bread, freedom, and dignity.^{111 112} Therefore, the protests started primarily as a claim to the governing elites to take social responsibility and subsequently questioned the political order.

The April 6 Youth Movement and their highly visible and public demonstrations was jointly responsible for the demission of President Mubarak on 11 February 2011, but was politically marginalized in the context of the first parliamentary elections. The Islamist groups, and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood had the edge over other parties, because they were already well connected; hence, they won voters favor. However when in charge, the Muslim Brotherhood still struggled with its in-house debates about a common policy. Moreover, the organization faced an experienced and at least disobliging bureaucracy. Instead of a strategy of disentangling, the Muslim Brotherhood followed the aphorism divide and conquer, cooperated with the bureaucracy in order to secure just vested power. On the other hand, the liberal parties had not gotten a political mandate to form a government; rather they demanded both freedom and an

¹¹¹ Dignity including social justice is manifest in the arabic word Kamara; Kamara was also a common slogan during the Arabellion.

¹¹² Julia Tieke, "Karama! Die Bedeutung der 'Wuerde' bei den arabischen Aufstaenden," Deutschlandradio-Forschung und Gesellschaft, 15 August 2013, accessed 10 October 2014, <http://www.deutschlandradiokultur.de/karama-die-bedeutung-der-wurde-bei-den-arabischen.media.108d41f68756ba3507bb3bc6fe4cc146.pdf>.

intervention of the armed forces. Neither did the liberal parties realize the contradiction of their claims, nor did they seek the institutional contest of ideas in the parliament. As a result, both political movements tried to work each other into the ground and fraternized with elites of the former government for different reasons, but with striving for power in mind. Both courses of action consolidated the old regime and not those who proclaimed change.¹¹³

Today, in the face of the Constitution of 2014 and government of President El Sisi, former chair of the Military Council and minister of defense, the relative strength of Egypt's major protagonists has changed again. The key players are first, the armed forces and the "Deep State."¹¹⁴ In addition, there is the Liberal Movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (banned in September 2013), and the more orthodox Islamic forces of the Salafiyya; and last but not least, the business elites of the country appear on the scene again.

¹¹³ Nagwan El Ashal, "Aegypten am Rande der Unregierbarkeit," *Kurz gesagt, Stiftung fuer Wissenschaft und Politik*, 28 February 2013, accessed 11 September 2014, <http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/kurz-gesagt/aegypten-am-rande-der-unregierbarkeit.html>.

¹¹⁴ "In short, the deep state refers to non-democratic leaders within a country—often hidden beneath layers of bureaucracy, but in tangible control of key resources (whether human or financial). They may not be in complete control at all times, but certainly hold sway and are independent of any political changes that take place." Ahmed Abdul-Azim, "What is the Deep State?" *On Religion*, 4 July 2013, accessed 10 October 2014, <http://www.onreligion.co.uk/what-is-the-deep-state/>.

The Liberal Movement and the Rocky Road to Substantial Political Participation

“The outcome of the Arab awakening will not be determined by those who launched it.”¹¹⁵ The followers of the liberal opposition¹¹⁶ are currently the losers of the political overthrow they have so decisively supported. This statement was given after the first parliamentary election that brought the Muslim Brotherhood into power in 2012; it is valid again.

At this particular time, two issues were relevant for the marginalization of the liberal and secular movement. First, the movement consists mainly of liberal activists who have become victims of repression and arrest in the post-revolutionary phase, and who therefore have been massively restricted in their political activities and development. The other reason is that their decentralized and rather weak organization and the communication via new media proved to be advantageous during the upheaval, but most disadvantageous during the competition for votes. The fractionalization of their political messages with regard to events that occurred after having achieved the unifying action of ousting Hosni Mubarak has been symptomatic of this movement; and it still is today.

The liberal forces gathered again, this time under the banner of the National Salvation Front to force the demission of President Morsi. As already determined, they focused on an extra-parliamentary opposition, cooperated with the armed forces after the

¹¹⁵ Hussein Agba and Robert Malley, “The Arab Counterrevolution,” *The New York Review of Books*, 29 September 2011, accessed 18 June 2014, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/sep/29/arab-counterrevolution>.

¹¹⁶ This refers to the parties and factions with a mostly secular modern and partly pro-Western program such as the New Wafd Party, the Egyptian Bloc or the April 6th Movement that supported the upheaval at Midan at-Tahrir.

overthrow, and supported the roadmap and the Constitutional Declaration of July 2013. The liberal movement made its contribution to the legitimacy of the transitional government. Again, the temporary coalition split up right after the common goal was achieved.

That is why today the liberal political camp consists of at least six major alliances. The future role of the Tamarod Movement founded in April 2013 is still unclear. It played a major role in organizing a multi-million signature campaign against the government of President Morsi and was supported by the major liberal protagonists like the National Salvation Front and in the meantime the banned April 6 Youth Movement. However, in the aftermath, the European press agency Reuters uncovered that the campaign got massive support from the ministry of the interior, police officers, and the business elites.¹¹⁷ Therefore, the Tamarod 2 Get Liberated group separated, while the main body founded the Arabic Popular Movement. The latter might gain some influence as a long arm of the government.

Amr Moussa, the former 2012 presidential candidate and head of the 50-member committee that revised the draft of the Constitution of 2014, started several attempts to forge a liberal alliance with chances of success in the next parliamentary election. So far, he is facing a stalemate because of the diversity of the parties and the general unwillingness to compromise.

¹¹⁷ Asma AlSharif and Yasmine Saleh, "Special Report–The Real Force Behind Egypt's 'Revolution of the State'," *Reuters*, 10 October 2013, accessed 12 October 2014, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/10/uk-egypt-interior-special-report-idUKBRE99908720131010>.

Furthermore, there are three major alliances that constitute catchment basins for different political ideologies: The Liberal Centric Wafd Alliance, the Left-Centric-Democratic Alliance for Civil Forces, and Egypt Front who represents former proponents of the Mubarak regime.¹¹⁸ Finally, there is the Free Egypt Party established in 2011. The founder Naguib Sawiris, who is an important Egyptian businessman advocates the establishment of a market economy, the equality of all citizens, and the separation of state and religion.¹¹⁹

Overall, the fragmentation of ideas, ideologies, and opinions is the major obstacle of the liberal movement on the road to a significant role in the political process. The current alliances are just partnerships of convenience for the parliamentary election. They are far away from a common agenda to constitute a powerful faction in the House of Representatives. The present constitution of the liberal movement plays into the hands of the government. The presence of a liberal movement, is proof of political pluralism. However, its fragmentation consolidates a position of insignificance. Even though protagonists in the Western countries long to see this way as the country's future,¹²⁰ the prospects of the liberal movement will depend on whether it will be capable of

¹¹⁸ Cherine Chams El-Dine, "Fragile Alliance in Egypt's Post-Revolutionary Order-The Military and Its Partners," German Institute for International and Security Affairs, October 2014, accessed 31 October 2014, http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/egypts_post_revolutionary_order.html.

¹¹⁹ IHS Jane's, "Executive Summary, Egypt," article #4, 5.

¹²⁰ Scholl-Latour, 8.

compromise, bring common ideas into the people's awareness, and match its messages with the reality of life of the population.¹²¹

Meanwhile, the Youth Movement that led the protest in February 2011 fell by the wayside. They have not really been able to organize themselves, to formulate political objectives instead of slogans and to anchor themselves in the social reality of the majority of the population. Nevertheless, the experience of political participation and articulation is not lost. The idea of freedom of speech is settled; it remains to be seen when the seed will grow.

The Armed Forces, Guardian of the Nation

Since 1952, the military has been a source of power and an integral part of a government that was civilian on paper only. Although in principle, it always stood loyally by the president, it never lost sight of its own interests. Its temporary alliance with the protesters of Midan at-Tahrir must therefore be understood as a well-calculated answer to an acute threat to its own power. Twice already, it applied the genius idea to differentiate between loyalty to the state and loyalty to the president.¹²² This strategy enabled the military leadership to present itself to the protest movement as the keeper of the interests of the people and at the same time to rid itself of the danger of a dynastic succession by Gamal Mubarak and subsequently a loss of power to the Muslim Brotherhood. In the

¹²¹ Ibid., 172-180; Kraushaar, 194-199; Gil Yaron, "Nicht mehr euphorisch," 10 February 2012, accessed 16 November 2014, <http://www.info-middle-east.com/news/nicht-mehr-euphorisch.html>.

¹²² "Ägyptens Armee verspricht Gewaltverzicht," *De Zeit*, 31 January 2011, accessed 31 July 2014, <http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2011-01/aegypten-proteste-ausgangssperre>.

aftermath of both overthrows, the military has seen itself confronted with having to cope with a multifaceted balancing act.

Again, the armed forces conjured the role of the guardian of the nation. Therefore, the interest is to preserve its own political and economic position,¹²³ and ensure the relative stability of the country. The goal is a generally accepted renovation of the state in such a manner that there will be no basis for a potential third revolutionary wave. In the context of the planned replacement of President Morsi, General El Sisi and the armed forces made several arrangements. First, the armed forces gained additional legitimacy by forming a broad alliance of opponents to the government of President Morsi.

Second, the government of interim President Mansour refaced a powerful position of proponents of the former Mubarak regime, in particular the Minister of Defense General El Sisi and the Minister of Interior Mohamed Ibrahim. This constellation ends the power struggle between a government led by the Muslim Brotherhood and a bureaucracy that is still driven by supporters of the old elites. Actually, President El Sisi can count on this “Deep State,” the layers of bureaucracy that guarantee the control of key resources and is quite resistant to political change.¹²⁴ The concept of Deep State is to a certain level, inherent to any system of governance. The peculiarity in Egypt is the more than 60 years of service to three autocratic governments and always being linked-up with the higher military command. Therefore, the initial success of the government is also a result of the willing support of the bureaucracy.

¹²³ Muriel Asseburg and Stephan Roll, “Ägyptens Stunde null?; Akteure, Interessen, Szenarien,” *SWP aktuell*, no. 10 (2011): 59.

¹²⁴ Abdul-Azim.

Third, the armed forces succeeded in implementing a stronghold in the Constitution of 2014. It is the major contradiction in the general democratic structure. Actually, the status of the forces is more autonomous than ever before in the history of the Egyptian Republic. Besides the fact that the military budget is only discussed in the executive National Defense Council and not a subject of the parliament; moreover, the in the council assembled representatives of the service branches and the intelligence services facilitate a significant influence on decisions about declaring war, sending forces abroad, and drafts respective the forces.¹²⁵ Most significant are the regulations that the minister of defense is an officer without exception, and that he is appointed by the supreme commander of the armed forces for the next two presidential terms. Although the president is the supreme commander of the armed forces, he lacks at least temporarily the full authority over the armed forces;¹²⁶ thereby the subtle dividing line between the military and the executive becomes manifest. The armed forces will always claim to place the concerns of the nation—per definition identical to the interests of the forces—over the existence of any government.

Finally, in the context of the overthrow of 2013, the armed forces accepted multi-billion dollar financial support from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. Therefore, the new government was able to facilitate a contribution to improve the sorry state economy. The ongoing uncertainty of the country's future particularly comprised the tourism industry. Egypt faced an existential financial crisis. President El

¹²⁵ Republic of Egypt, *Constitution of The Arab Republic of Egypt 2014*. articles 152, 203.

¹²⁶ El-Dine.

Sisi is aware that the recovery of the economy is both a corner stone for stability in the country and essential to maintain the supremacy of the armed forces. For this reason, his first step was a fallback to the economic involvement of the forces. This tradition arose with the end of the Egyptian-Israeli confrontation in the 1970s. Draftees became a new labor force and military restricted areas on the Sinai Peninsula became the workplace for Egypt's first public private partnerships.¹²⁷ At present, the Armed Forces Engineering Authority is supervising implementation of extensive infrastructure projects in order to fight unemployment and improve the economy. The challenge for President El Sisi is to rebalance the coexistence between the private sector and the military economic complex.¹²⁸ The current supervision of the investment in infrastructure creates an economic short-term boost and is well appreciated by the population. On one hand, the president is aware that only a developed private sector will generate sustainable economic prosperity. On the other hand, he knows that thereto he has to pay the price and cut the privileges of the military.

In his publication "The Power Elite," American sociologist Charles Wright Mills characterized a triangle of relationship that set the course for the US policy. Political, military, and economic elites share a common understanding and tend to form alliances, not only for state interests, but also for individual benefits. Mills' theory implies that a concentration of power leads to a centralization of authority among the elites of a

¹²⁷ Thomas Kohlmann, "Aegyptens Militaer-GmbH," Deutsche Welle, 3 March 2011, accessed 7 May 2014, <http://www.dw.de/%C3%A4gyptens-milit%C3%A4r-gmbh/a-14859726>.

¹²⁸ El-Dine.

society.¹²⁹ The Egyptian Armed Forces represent the advancement of Mills' society model, because currently the military controls all elements of the triangle.

For this reason, the principal of the armed forces' position is momentarily unchallenged and unquestioned. From today's view and in consideration of the situation of the other protagonists, a third revolution is highly unlikely. Hence, in the near future the military will define its role in the country by itself. Politically, the forces have a genuine interest in functional democratic institutions in order to legitimize the political system; at least in accordance with the Constitution of 2014 and as long as the specific role of the armed forces and the bureaucracy is not strongly questioned.

The decision making process of President El Sisi and his capability to exploit his current popularity are crucial. His character, his experience in the intelligence branch, and his adamant but smart decisions allow the conclusion that he already gained the necessary situational awareness and understanding.¹³⁰ These skills and the will to cut back the authority of forces and the linked bureaucracy, allow the legislative to act within the limits of the constitution, and to balance military and private economy will significantly affect the further development of the country.

Therefore, the future alignment of the armed forces manifests in three questions. Do the armed forces understand that the cutbacks are in their own long-term interests? Will the president entirely implement the constitution, and in particular determine the

¹²⁹ Charles Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1956), 217.

¹³⁰ BBC News, "Egypt Abdul Fattah al-Sisi Profile," 16 May 2014, accessed 17 October 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19256730>.

postponed parliamentary elections? Will the president and the armed forces be able to execute the transfer of power in accordance with the constitution?

The Business Elites and the Influence of the Armed Forces

The business elites are comprised of more than 20 Egyptian individuals and families who own the major companies in different sectors of the Egyptian economy and have a fortune of more than 100 million US dollars. This oligarchy is a result of a change in the Egyptian economy policy in the late 1990s and 2000s. The process of partial liberalization increased the political influence of several businessmen and built up a network to the leading circles of President Mubarak. Moreover, this new patronage caused unintended side effects that eventually fueled the breakout of Arabellion in February 2011, as well the resignation of President Mubarak.

On one hand, President Mubarak attempted to constitute the business elites as a future power base that eventually would allow his son Gamal Mubarak to become president. In addition to their suspicion against a dynastic succession, the armed forces foresaw a significant loss of political and economic power with President Gamal Mubarak.¹³¹ This fissure in the relationship between the military and the head of state elucidates one reason why the armed forces did not strike down the Arabellion, but decided to sacrifice Hosni Mubarak.¹³² On the other hand, the business elites approach to

¹³¹ Stephan Roll, "Aegyptens Unternehmerelite nach Mubarak–Machtvoller Akteur zwischen Militaer und Muslimbruderschaft," Stiftung fuer Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2013, accessed 10 July 2014, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2013_S14_rll.pdf.

¹³² Clija Harders, "Die Umbrueche in der Arabischen Welt: Zwischen Revolution und Restauration," in *Protests, revolutions and transformations – the Arab World in a*

maximize their profits at all costs increased the economic pressure on the ordinary people and fueled the protests for bread, freedom, and dignity.

After the overthrow of the Mubarak regime, the business elites got off Scot-free. Neither there was plot of the Armed Forces to settle old scores, nor the government of President Morsi tried to cut back the privileges of the entrepreneurs. On the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood tried to form strategic alliances with the economic oligarchy in order to gain their support and overcome the economic crisis in the context of the change of government. However, there was little feedback because most entrepreneurs suspected the political Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood's failing in their economic policies expedited the failure of the Morsi government.¹³³

In fact, the business elites backed the overthrow in July 2013, and in particular gave financial support to the Tamarod campaign, because they expected a considerable improvement of the political stability and the security situation in the country. Actually, the situation worsened right after the overthrow and travel warnings of European countries increased the damage in particular for the tourism industry. However, the economic oligarchy still supported the technocratic government of interim President Mansour and blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for the escalation of violence.

At present, it is uncertain, whether the economic oligarchy will pursue the course of ruthless profit maximization or want to contribute to a stable state and the

Period of Upheaval, Center for Middle Eastern & North African Politics, Freie Universitaet Berlin, July 2011, accessed 2 September 2014, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2013_S14_rll.pdf, 25.

¹³³ Stephan Roll, "Aegyptens Unternehmerelite nach Mubarak – Machtvoller Akteur zwischen Militaer und Muslimbruderschaft.

democratization of the country. On one hand, Egyptian businessman and billionaire Naguib Sawiris offered a billion dollar investment to support the reconstruction of infrastructure in November 2013. On the other hand, he criticized the extent of subsidies and demanded a one-year ban of all protests to rebuild the economy and set the prerequisites for the tourism industry.¹³⁴ In fact, the network between the current government and the business elites is still working, but the hoped for unconditioned support of President El Sisi stays away thus far. The entrepreneurs just faced a cut of some privileges due to the rise of fuel prices that will raise the costs for the heavy industries and a tax on stock trading proceeds. Maximum and minimum wages, as well as progressive taxes are still in discussion. Moreover, now the economic strategy prefers investments supervised by the Armed Forces Engineering Authority with only private companies as subcontractors.¹³⁵ These interventions are a strong signal by the government to point out its capacity to act and the attempt to force success.

So far, the business oligarchy limits its criticism to a cut of funding and donations for the government. That is why the president invited a wide spectrum of entrepreneurs, including former Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations, but excluded the former supporters of Gamal Mubarak. He is aware of the fact that a sustainable economic recovery needs the private investments of the business elites.

The invitation is an offer for talks, but following the government's rules of the game. Otherwise, the business elites need political stability, but above all economic

¹³⁴ Michael Georgy and Yasmine Saleh, "Ägyptischer Wirtschaftsmagnat warnt vor dem Zusammenbruch," *Reuters*, 14 November 2013, accessed 9 October 2014, <http://de.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idDEBEE9AD05R20131114>.

¹³⁵ El-Dine.

opportunities. That is why the current process of negotiations will be a preliminary decision for the further economic course of the country. Both parties are aware of their overlapping interests. Stability will allow economic prosperity and profit for the entrepreneurs, and in turn financial freedom of action, social stability, and legitimacy for the government. There are still two open questions. First, has President El Sisi the power to and will the armed forces accept a cut back of their own economic privileges in order to facilitate the implementation of market economy structures, provide an independent private sector, and set the conditions for sustainable prosperity? Second, does the business oligarchy accept the preeminence of the government, the economic participation of the military, and limitations of the strategy of profit maximization as a responsible contribution for the Egyptian society?

Salafiyya: Successor of the Muslim Brotherhood?

Salafi movements, constituted in particular in the 1970s, were a response to the presumed doctrinal negligence of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to form a new and temporarily violent opposition to the regimes of Al Sadat and Mubarak. Over the past decades, the Salafiyya gained its primary support in the small cities and the sparsely populated countryside. Even if these extremist movements had renounced violence under the massive pressure of the old regime around the turn of the millennium,¹³⁶ their ideological orientation remained more or less the same and focused on the implementation of society based on Islamic sources of law and following the idea of return to the assumed ideological roots of the first generations of Islam in the 7th century

¹³⁶ Perthes, *Geheime Gärten. Die neue arabische*, 187.

C.E.¹³⁷ While suppressed under the Mubarak regime, the Salafist movements joined and formed the Islamic Bloc immediately after the overthrow in 2011. This ultra-conservative coalition for the upcoming elections was especially influenced by the Salafi Call movement and its political wing the Al Nour Party, as well as the Construction and Development Party. Altogether, they received more than one-fourth of the votes in the People's Assembly during the first parliamentary elections and thus had an unexpectedly strong mandate.

Due to its ideological roots, the Salafiyya was suspicious of democratic political participation in the beginning. The decision to form the Islamic Bloc marked a major step, realizing that political influence is a result of participation and articulation. However, the political demands were vague, summarized under the slogan of "Islam is the only solution,"¹³⁸ and revealed the manifold and internally often incompatible ideological positions and the heterogeneity of political Islam overall. After the assembly of the parliament, the ideological basis of the Islamic Bloc that the Shar'ia is the only source of legislation and all day life caused the major conflict with the liberal movements. Even the Muslim Brotherhood pursued a more differentiated course of action.

The parliamentary process illustrated the limits of doctrinal purity to the Salafi parties. Hence, facing the pressure of the very powerful Muslim Brotherhood the major

¹³⁷ Scholl-Latour, 208-214. Major sources of Islam are the Koran and the Sunna. The application and interpretation of the writings is the task of the Fiqh, the Islamic jurisprudence which is realized in the method of lawmaking, the Sharia, as a collection of all laws and regulations.

¹³⁸ Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 159.

representative of the movement, the Al Nour Party accepted the rules of the political game, opened to a pragmatic approach, and formed alliances with the liberal movements. In fact, the party joined the opposition against President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013. In addition to the natural competition with the Muslim Brotherhood and the increasing violence, the main reason for this was the pro-Shia and pro-Iran policy of the president, an absolute and indissoluble discrepancy to the Sunni ideology of the Salafiyya. Notably, this decision led to further divisions within the movement and to the secession of the ultra-orthodox Al Watan Party.¹³⁹

After the withdrawal of the government of President Morsi in July 2013, the Salafist movements and in particular the Al Nour Party face an ambivalent situation. On one hand, they benefit from the decline and the ban of the Muslim Brotherhood and are now the main representatives of Islamic ideology. Moreover, the support for President El Sisi bolstered the legitimacy of the new government and assured in return the position of the Al Nour Party in the new power constellation. On the other hand, this step to support the overthrow brought the party in opposition to a significant part of the Islamic political spectrum. It is unlikely that Al Nour will gather former members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, the Islamic parties are highly dependent on the goodwill of the El Sisi government. The reason is a passage in the Constitution of 2014 that

¹³⁹ Nagwan El Ahswal, "Egyptian Salafism between Religious Movement and Realpolitik, - Adapting to the Demands of the Political Game," German Institute for International and Security Affairs, August 2013, accessed 10 October 2014, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2013C27_ngw.pdf.

emphasizes that political parties are not allowed to be based on religion.¹⁴⁰ In the current power constellation, the government defines the parameters of an illegal religious party.

That is why the Salafiyya and the Al Nour party as the main representative of the movement face a conflicting future. In general, all elections in the post-Mubarak era reflected the attractiveness of the Salafiyya. Therefore, a political mandate and a basis of legitimacy for the movement's participation in developing the future foundation of the Egyptian state exist. Therefore, success in the next parliamentary election will depend on four aspects: First, is the movement capable of finding a legitimate balance between their own ideology and the obvious dependency on the government's goodwill? Second, is there a chance to regain at least parts of the credentials lost because of the support of Morsi's overthrow? Third, is Salafiyya willing to overcome its own split up and form at least a coalition between the Al Nour and the Al Watan party? Finally, will there be a tolerated political organization of the Muslim Brotherhood that would compete with the Salafiyya?

What is the Future of the Muslim Brotherhood?

The decline of the formerly powerful Muslim Brotherhood after the ouster of President Morsi manifests in three events. First on 23 September 2013, the Egypt Court for Urgent Matters in Cairo ruled the ban of the Muslim Brotherhood after the socialist and anti-religious Tammagu Party's accusation of terrorism. Aside from the fact that the Tammagu Party wants to preserve the achievements of the Egypt Revolution of 1952,

¹⁴⁰ El-Dine; Republic of Egypt, *Constitution of The Arab Republic of Egypt 2014*, article 74.

there is no evidence that the lawsuit was indirectly filed by the new government.¹⁴¹

Second on 25 December 2014, the cabinet of President El Sisi declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, banned all activities of the movement, and made any support or participation in the movement's activities a punishable offense. The government's reason was a deadly car bombing a day before. The Muslim Brotherhood denied any responsibility for the attack.¹⁴² Finally, on 9 August 2014, a court in Cairo ordered the dissolution of the Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood and confiscated all its property. The court determined that since 1928 the organization had used Islam as an instrument to pursue its political goals, including the use of force if necessary. This decision ended for now the possibility of an en bloc in the next parliamentary elections.¹⁴³ Thereby it is important to illustrate that the actual goal of the Muslim Brotherhood was a more Islamic society. The allegation to establish a dictatorship was without any foundation.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ David D. Kirkpatrick, "Egyptian Court Shuts Down the Muslim Brotherhood and Seizes Its Assets," *The New York Times*, 23 September 2013, accessed 12 October 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/world/middleeast/egyptian-court-bans-muslim-brotherhood.html?_r=0.

¹⁴² Erin Cunningham, "Egypt's Military-backed Government Declares Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization," *Washington Post*, 25 December 2013, accessed 12 October 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypts-military-backed-government-declares-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-organization/2013/12/25/7cf075ca-6da0-11e3-aecc-85cb037b7236_story.html.

¹⁴³ "Gericht verbietet Partei der Muslimbrueder," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 9 August 2014, accessed 14 October 2014, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/afrika/aegyten-gericht-verbietet-partei-der-muslimbrueder-13089336.html>.

¹⁴⁴ Petra Ramsauer, "Fuer islamisches Reich mit Kalifen," *Kurier*, 29 March 2014, accessed 30 September 2014, <http://kurier.at/chronik/oberoesterreich/petra-ramsauer-fuer-islamisches-reich-mit-kalifen/58.232.445>.

The history of the Muslim Brotherhood is characterized by an ongoing struggle about its ideology, as well as its position in the society. Hassan Al Banna, an Egyptian schoolteacher and imam, founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 as a political, social, and religious movement that called for a renewal of the society based on the Shari'ah. The relationship to the Egyptian government was always very fluid. However, phases of brutal suppression followed by mere tolerance did not prevent the increasing significance and reputation in society. In particular, under the rule of President Mubarak the Muslim Brotherhood was politically active and dedicated to social-welfare adopting governmental responsibilities and developing its internal structures. These activities resulted in an established position as mainstream of the Egyptian society; moreover, the resulting experience was the basis for the immediate political participation after there Arabellion in 2011 and the success in the following elections. The height of power under President Morsi followed an unprecedented downfall in Egypt's history.

Today, after the ouster of President Morsi and the ban of whole organizational structure, the Muslim Brotherhood faces the most existential threat since its foundation in 1928. Once again, the outlawed leaders and protagonists had to return to a life in the underground. Although today, the government of President El Sisi does not even allow semi-legal existence anymore. Actually, the government attempts to take over the social and financial networks and thereby the organization's backbone and link to society. That is why the current Muslim Brotherhood is far away from its former position of unofficial

social welfare. It is more decentralized, organized in small groups and fighting for bare survival of the ideology.¹⁴⁵

After the shock due to the ouster of President Morsi and the violent repression of the protests, the struggle for survival now accompanies an indefinite temper of resistance and the willingness to resume the long-lasting fight with an uncertain outcome. So far, there is no long-term strategy, but still the demand from day one of the overthrow to reinsert President Morsi and his government. The persistence on this demand is unrealistic in the view of several charges against Mohamed Morsi and his leading inner circle. However, the official opinion does not indicate that the Muslim Brotherhood suffered a loss of reality; rather the organization is neither in a constitution to run a critical self-reflection nor it is capable to develop an organized articulation of a common strategy. The mass arrests of members, as well as the permanent pressure of the current government have a significant impact on the organization. The recruitment of new members and concerted actions beyond the small group level are severely hampered.¹⁴⁶ A side effect of the current fragmentation and the lack of guidance is that different groups develop diverging answers to the government. As always, when the Muslim Brotherhood was suppressed in the past, there are indicators of a potential split-up into a peaceful and a violent wing.

Momentarily, the Muslim Brotherhood is struggling for survival and lost momentum and initiative. Projections about the organization's future have to start with

¹⁴⁵ Karim Fahimjan, "The Muslim Brotherhood, Back in a Fight to Survive," *The New York Times*, 5 January 2014, accessed 22 October 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/world/middleeast/the-muslim-brotherhood-back-in-a-fight-to-survive.html>.

¹⁴⁶ Fahimjan.

the intent of the government. At the present, neither its strategy is clear nor whether President El Sisi possesses absolute freedom of action. That is why there are at least two possible courses of action. First, the most dangerous course of action for the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as for the stability of the country, is that the government actually attempts to annihilate the whole organization. The danger for the organization is simply the unlikely case of total destruction. The history of the Muslim Brotherhood, the now decentralized structure, and the still existing sympathy for the ideology in the population allow the well-founded conclusion that this goal is out of reach. It is possible to kill people, destruct an organization, but nearly impossible to eradicate an ideology that attracts people. The presumed result of the most dangerous course of action is that the government will lose the initiative and then a recovered and radicalized Muslim Brotherhood will start a long war of attrition. The end of such a confrontation is not foreseeable, but the likelihood of a lasting threat for Egypt's integrity as a nation state, as well as a society is evident.

Second, the most likely course of action is that the strategy of the government is targeted on an effective enfeeblement of Muslims, disruption of its social and organizational networks, and adoption of the sources of finance in order to compel an unconditional surrender. The idea behind this course of action is a future reintegration of the Muslim Brotherhood, but on the terms of President El Sisi and with respect to the regime and the preeminence of the armed forces. The integration of the most powerful opponent of the current government would underpin its legitimacy and reputation. Furthermore, this strategy would marginalize the extreme opposition to a conglomerate of

small and radical splinter groups, and therefore contribute to significant progress in the country's stability.

The assessment of the likeliness of the depicted courses of action relates only to the prospect of success in terms of a stabile Egypt. This is not an evaluation of the occurrence probability of one of the courses of action, because the decision-making processes in the government, as well as in the relevant leading circles are unknown. Moreover, the analyzed sources do not facilitate an estimate of patterns of individual decision-making.¹⁴⁷

From the perspective of the protagonist of the Muslim Brotherhood, two options exist. On the one hand, the organization can accept the role of an underground movement in order to recover and resume the fight by force and other means with the result of a long war of attrition with an open outcome, but a definite negative impact on Egypt itself. On the other hand, the Brotherhood starts to seek a reconciliation and reintegration on the government's terms. The necessary ideological realignment would presumeably split the organization paired with a significant loss of credibility, in particular after the government's brutal suppression and the death of thousands of members.¹⁴⁸ Otherwise in the foreseeable future, this course of action is the only realistic chance for political participation. The strategy of reintegration demands at least the same perseverance as the course of resistance, but holds the chance of political influence and a perspective of evolutionary change and regaining credit as a movement of social welfare.

¹⁴⁷ Refer to chapter 2 of this thesis.

¹⁴⁸ El-Dine.

Conclusion

The origins of the protests in Tunisia and later in Egypt were initially a question of bread, freedom, and dignity and a consequence of a claim to the governing elites to meet their social responsibilities. The subsequent challenge of the political order was an unintended side effect. While the major protagonists did not change during the Arabellion in 2011 and its aftermath until the renewed change of power in July 2013, their power constellation did. The current relation of the Liberal Movement, the armed forces, the business elites, the Salafiyya, and the Muslim Brotherhood, does not only reflect their failure in the application of democracy and the resulting changing events in Egypt; but also their relevance, prospects, and possible contributions to a restored public order as well as their potentially corrupting influence.

The lasting credit of the Liberal Movement, and in particular, the youth movements who protested at the Tahrir Square are that they initiated a chain of reaction of events that started with the resignation of President Mubarak. Simultaneously, they entrapped themselves in a fragmentation of ideas and opinions explaining the relative weakness of the movement today. Nevertheless, the Liberal Movement is still a relevant actor in Egypt, how relevant among others depends on the capability to apply to the rules of negotiation and tactical compromise. The legacy for the future is the ideas of freedom and change that are now settled in the people's minds.

The Egyptian Armed Forces once more claimed the role of the guardian of the nation. In fact, the current government of President El Sisi, the forces itself, and last but not least, the bureaucracy, are for once more powerful than before the Arabellion. In this context, the events of the Arabellion and in particular the ouster of President Mubarak

illustrated that the interests of the head of state and the armed forces do not need to be congruent. The leadership of President El Sisi denotes his awareness of this subtle difference. Nevertheless, the president and armed forces gained an unparalleled preeminence and hold the initiative. Hence, it is their vested interest and their responsibility to envision a road map for the country's future. Moreover, it is the task to integrate all relevant actors, and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, that will allow them a face-saving participation, and to make the necessary concessions to facilitate the prosperity of the country. Overall, the Egyptian Armed Forces' capacity to critically reflect its own position is in question. Are the forces and their leadership able to make necessary cutbacks and abandon absolute power in order to fulfill its mission as guardian of the nation and allow a sustainable guarantee of the future?

In turn, the prospects of the business elites are interlocked with the capability of the armed forces to cut back their economic activities. In general, the situation of the entrepreneurs in Egypt is still comfortable. The overthrows and the economic crisis had no crucial impact on their personal wealth. On the contrary, the business elites are aware of their potential benefit of the development of the country and the government's legitimacy. In addition to the matter of how both parties will balance their extensive network and their economic activities, the decisive question to the business oligarchy is how they adapted their lessons identified by the Arabellion 2011. Did they realize that their strategy of profit maximization contributed to the protest and do they want to abstain from some of their privileges in order to take responsibility for the common welfare?

On the other hand, the Salafiyya faces an existential challenge. One dilemma of the movement is that its major representative, the Al Nour Party lost credit because of the support of the overthrow of President Morsi. This is why there is little prospect of filling the Muslim Brotherhood's shoes. The other dilemma is the weak political position due to the new constitution that prohibits parties based on religion. Therefore, the Salafi movements, and in particular the Al Nour party have to balance their activities between political authenticity and the goodwill of the government. Nevertheless, the Salafiyya still attracts a significant part of the population and hence has a legitimate mandate. Moreover, despite their ultra-conservative ideology the movement already proved their ability to compromise. There is no question that Salafiyya and its ideology represent one important political perspective of the Egyptian society. However, the specific role and a possible competition to a new representative of a more moderate Islam is still up in the air.

Finally, the future of the Muslim Brotherhood will have an authoritative impact on the power constellation of the relevant Egyptian actors. The massive suppression disrupted the organization and forced its members underground. Although the military holds the initiative, and therefore has to communicate a change in the conflict first, the Muslim Brotherhood has to realize that it is at a crossroads. At this point, a return to former power is beside the point. In fact, the movement's protagonists have to decide on a way of resistance or a way of reconciliation and reintegration. In any case, the future will be a rocky road for the Muslim Brotherhood.

In particular, the dilemma of the Muslim Brotherhood illuminates the main cleavages in the current power constellation. The Arabellion and the aftermath changed

the power constellation, but did not change the task for the relevant political protagonists. The people demanded bread, freedom, dignity, and later political participation. The problem did not change. Even though the armed forces and the current government are in a preeminent position, the prospect of success for sustainable development of the country, and therefore for legitimacy and power preservation. The challenge for all protagonists is to gain a real political perspective in order to realize that there are common interests and a shared vision of a prospering country.

The Development of a Fractured and Fragmented Society

Since the Arabellion in 2011, the Egyptian population faces an all-embracing process of transformation. The population is ethnically and religiously homogeneous, because more than 90 percent are Egyptian-Arabs and believe in Sunni Islam. The Christian Copts are a significant religious minority. On the other hand, the society is politically and demographically divided, as well as by their living environment. Furthermore, the Egyptian civil society was traditionally weak and fractured. This fact is the cause and the point of origin for the consideration about the Egyptian society.¹⁴⁹

The historical weakness of the Egyptian civil society and the lack of political participation are related to the decades of limited offers of political participation. In particular, the state of emergency laws during the reign of President Mubarak restricted the influence of elections and the options to engage in non-governmental organizations. On the contrary, the tolerated semi-legal charity and social-welfare activities of the Muslim Brotherhood did not even support a spread of plurality of opinion, but

¹⁴⁹ IHS Jane's, "Executive Summary, Egypt," article #4, 10.

transported its ideology exclusively. The state controlled media could not contribute to the formation of political opinions either. Of course, the Egyptians had political opinions. However, before the Arabellion these opinions were merely irrelevant because they did not affect the governance of the country. On the other hand, the lack of political discourse affected the communication of different political opinions. In fact, it did not happen and fragmented the society politically. That is where the demographic structure and the living environments of the population get involved. Approximately two-fifths of the population lives in urban areas and more than one-third is younger than 15 years old.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, in Egypt about 70 percent of the population is less than 35-years old. Although this generation and the youth movements lost political influence after the ouster in July 2013, the tendency of an annually growing population is a matter of fact. It is not whether, but only when this well-educated generation will again demand political participation.¹⁵¹ While the demographic trend is a time bomb, the urban-rural divide is an indicator for two entirely different ways of life. Both illustrate a socially fragmented society.

In combination with the lack of civil society, there is strong evidence that on the eve of the Arabellion, the Egyptian population lives in parallel societies with stove piped political opinions. That is why after the ouster of President Mubarak a vast number of political groups appear. In many cases, the groups only represented individual and particular interests. The peasant living in the rural area of the country has different needs and a different political view than the 25-year-old graduate who lives in the city of Cairo. The challenge is to balance two opposed trends. On one hand, an emerging political scene

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., article #2, 6.

¹⁵¹ Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 30-31.

develops a variety of political opinions. The tendency of all these groups is to become significant, pursue its program, and be distinctive to others. The result is a hard-line position to political programs of other groups. On the other hand, the relevance of a political idea rises, if it is possible to tie groups to a coalition or a party. A typical indicator for a growing civil society in comparison to an established one is the composition of the parliament. While four parties represent the population in the German parliament, and only two different parties represent the population in the US Congress, the Egyptian parliament of 2012 consisted of 26 different parties, 30 independent and 10 appointed representatives.¹⁵²

Furthermore, the foundation of political parties is a long-term process of progress and setbacks. In the absence of a developed civil society, tolerance, and established democratic rules of the game, the dispute is accompanied by violence against minorities, political opponents, and discriminated groups like women. In particular, violence against women and sexual harassment are an increasing phenomenon in Egypt; primarily based on a still common view on the inferiority of women. In addition to other issues, it is an indicator of an ongoing conflict about the structure of a future society.

In summary, the events since the Arabellion illustrate four facets about the condition of civil society in Egypt. First, after the ban of the Muslim Brotherhood the Egyptian population is confronted with another face of political repression. It is the attempt of the government to facilitate the development of a civil society, but following

¹⁵² Gamal Essam El-Din, "Egypt's post-Mubarak legislative life begins amid tension and divisions," *Ahram Online*, 23 January 2012, accessed 22 October 2014, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/100/32384/Elections-/News/Egypt-postMubarak-legislative-life-begins-amid-te.aspx>.

the rules of the regime. The expansion of political participation is, despite existing parties, limited due to the lack of a parliament, the ban of a major Islamic movement, and a constitution that is not fully applied thus far. Second, the historical lack of an Egyptian civil society causes a process of self-discovery for the population. Therefore, the existing fragmentation meets a lack of democratic culture. The result is an ongoing clash of ways of lives, ideologies, and prospects for the future. The painful and sporadically violent development process is an essential part of the transformation of a society. Finally, the demographic structure of the country in the end is the main game changer. Despite the fact that the youth movements lost influence during the ongoing political disruptions after 2011, it is evident that the youth was a main booster during the Arabellion. This generation is well educated, but has few chances to get a job, rent a domicile, and start a family. This is the reason they started the protests about bread, freedom and dignity. It was initially a demand for social participation in a petrified community. Therefore, the current government is well advised to meet in particular the needs of the youth. That is why the youth of the country has two advantages in comparison to President El Sisi: They are increasing daily and time is on their side. Furthermore, the Arabellion provided awareness for change and political participation to the Egyptian population. Despite the fact that an Egyptian civil society is not established yet the idea is deep-seated now. Although political participation appears weaker today than in 2011, the actual strength of the society is that everything is set for future change.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Certain are that nothing is certain. Not even this.

— Joachim Ringelnatz, “Joachim Ringelnatz Quotes,” in *Linguee*

The long-lasting outcomes of the Arabellion in Egypt in 2011 are still uncertain. Certain is, that the “Arab Spring”¹⁵³ held off. On the contrary, the Arabellion turns out to be a highly complex, in parts chaotic, and unique event that only introduced a long-term process of transformation. The outcome of this process is in generally open. Complexity and chaos are qualities that are related to overthrows and revolutionary change in general. Singular, because there is no monolithic Greater Middle East and insofar that the Egyptian way of change cannot be compared with events in neighbor countries. Of course, there are similarities, but more often, there are differences that relate to the individual constitution of a country.

Therefore, the analysis how the Arabellion affects the strength of Egypt as a nation state responds to a unique question with limited explanatory power for other countries. That the Arabellion affected and still affects Egypt is without question. This conclusion consolidates the insights that were collected using the secondary questions of this thesis.

¹⁵³ Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 7-9.

A Rebellion not a Revolution

“A revolution is a major, sudden, and hence typical violent alteration in government and in related associations and structures.”¹⁵⁴ In turn, Aristotle depicted two attributes of a revolution. The complete change from one constitution to another or the modification of an existing constitution.¹⁵⁵ On the contrary, the attribute of a rebellion is the refusal of obedience to an existing political order causing a violent or non-violent replacement of the existing authority.¹⁵⁶ What both concepts have in common is that despite popular statements and bloomy attributes like “Arab Spring”¹⁵⁷ and “Jasmine Revolution,”¹⁵⁸ the disruption of an existing order is usually accompanied by chaos and violence and that the outcome is uncertain.

Characterizing the upheaval in Egypt in 2011 as Arabellion or rebellion and not as a revolution, is in accordance with the depicted definitions, but does not foreclose significant long-term change in the country. Moreover, the term addresses Egypt’s specific historical background as a nation and the initial intent of the protests. First, modernization in the history of the Egyptian Republic was always an interaction of

¹⁵⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica, “Revolution,” accessed 27 September 2014, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/500584/revolution>.

¹⁵⁵ Aristotle, *Politics*, Book Five, trans. Benjamin Jowett, The Internet Classics Archive, 350 B.C.E., accessed 17 September 2014, <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.5.five.html>.

¹⁵⁶ John J. Lalor, ed., *Cyclopædia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States*, Library of Economics and Liberty, accessed 7 August 2014, <http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Lalor/llCy.html>, 632.

¹⁵⁷ Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 7-9.

¹⁵⁸ Schmid, 15-18.

movement and counter-movement between the regime and the opposition and more or less resulted in a phase of oppression. Second, a significant structure of Egyptian rule was the existing division of labor where the central government shared the peripheral state control with a social group or movement. Finally, despite Egypt addressing itself as a republic since 1953, the concept of democracy was exploited over decades for the power assurance of a regime, but not as a form of government and political participation for and by the population.

Reflecting the Arabellion of 2011, the upheaval was initially in the tradition of Egyptian history. The protesters demanded only the withdrawal of the head of state and not a revolution. The division of labor did not change either, as well as the lack in application of democratic rules. Moreover, the initial protests articulated the demand of bread, freedom, and dignity. Therefore, the protests primarily started as a claim to the governing elites to take social responsibility. Because of their incapacity, the protests subsequently questioned the political order. Nevertheless, the characterization of the upheaval as a rebellion, an Arabellion, does not decrease its short-term and long-term effects on the Egyptian nation.

How the Arabellion Affects the Strength of Egypt as a Nation State

In the context of the period from the withdrawal of President Mubarak to the inauguration of President El Sisi, the Arabellion caused three immediate effects. First, the protests disrupted the unity of head of state and the Egyptian Armed Forces and displayed different interests. This fact later influenced the Constitution of 2014. Second, the forced resignation of the head of state broke up the rigid political structures. Even though the regime initially stayed in charge and enforced a successor of their own, the protests

initiated a change in the current power constellation. The Arabellion was a catalyst that opened the door for change rather than being the game changer itself. As a result, the continuing political disruption enabled a beginning change in the political and social structure of the country. Even the strategy of President El Sisi to revoke the armed forces role as guardian related to the initial protesters' demands and should highlight accountability.

The content of the Constitution of 2014 also accommodates these demands and is an attempt to gain and to project legitimacy. For that purpose, the preamble links to Egyptian history and envisions the idea of an indivisible nation and a common destiny. Moreover, the constitution rebalances the relationship between nation state and religion in favor of the legislation. In turn, the powerful role of the armed forces, aside from the democratic system of division of power, illustrates the specific Egyptian perspective on the role of its military. However, the constitution is a commitment of a consolidation of the political participation, civil society, and social welfare. It is certainly an unredeemed commitment because the government does not fully apply the constitution thus far. Again, the Arabellion is the catalyst of events that lead to the new constitution as an important source of power, but does not provide the direction of development.

Furthermore, the Arabellion affects the power constellation of the relevant political actors. The original plea to the elites to take on responsibility became a challenge for the political order after the same elites proved their incapability of answering the demands. Since then, the relevant actors have been exposed to permanent pressure to legitimize their actions. In particular, the ignorance of the business oligarchy and its strategy of profit maximizing triggered the upheaval. One result is the pragmatic

knowledge that the future power relations will depend on legitimacy in accordance with the original demands of bread, freedom, and dignity. The Arabellion initiated both the disruption of the existing balance of power open options for political action for the different movements, the armed forces, and the business elites and the impulse for the development of a civil society.

Altogether, the disturbances of the Arabellion implied a significant debilitation of the Egyptian sources of power, the elites, and the nation state for the short term.

Otherwise, the upheaval, and in particular the events in the aftermath brought the fractures and contradictions into light. The beginning struggle for the civil society highlights the cleavages between the generations and rural and urban lifestyle. Due to the lack of experience in the democratic rules of the game, the fight for ideologies is an ongoing violent process of progress and setbacks. Decisive for the development of the Egyptian society, is the competition of ideologies, the contest of argumentation, and the acquisition of compromise and negotiation as tools for conflict resolution. Regardless of the actual lack of democracy in the country, the constant values are the knowledge of participation and negotiation structures in civil societies.

Finally, it is significant that the initial protests that led to the Arabellion were an uprising of the Egyptian youth. The demographic structure of the country depicts the youth as the main game changer in the end. The youth movements did not only disrupt and wake the old elites, but also articulated their demands and questioned the legitimacy of the social and political order. The initiators of the resignation of President Mubarak have in the truest sense of the word the potential to survive any rule.

In this context is the main criticism that the Arabellion created more setbacks than progress thus far. In particular, the seizure of power by the armed forces, a former officer as head of state, and the current discrepancy in the implementation of the new constitution serve as indicators to prove the failure of the upheaval. Even though it is a frustrating and unsatisfying knowledge, it is evident that the contemporaries of a downfall, rebellion, or revolution notice the setbacks of the process and often do not benefit from the long-term effects. Sometimes fundamental political change takes decades or generations. On one hand, the Prague Spring of 1968 failed in a short-term perspective, but it was a catalyst in the end and facilitated changes in Eastern Europe that led to the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. On the other hand, the European revolutions of 1848, the most widespread call for freedom, political participation, and civil society in Europe that time, soon collapsed under the repression of military forces that stood loyal to the ruling royalties. Nevertheless, the progressive political ideas outlived and shaped European history for the next century.¹⁵⁹

That is why the inauguration of President El Sisi is more than just the pure restoration of the pre-Arabellion era. Besides the fact that the Mubarak regime is history now, the Arabellion leaves a population, and in particular a youth aware of its potential and influence. Moreover, the experiment with a free elected government is also gone, but there are lasting impressions and experience in political participation. In addition, the current governments, as well as the relevant protagonists face a recent pressure to

¹⁵⁹ Ben Hubbard and Rick Gladstone, “Arab Spring Countries Find Peace is Harder Than Revolution,” *The New York Times*, 14 August 2013, accessed 30 October 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/world/middleeast/egypt-bloodshed-may-be-ill-omen-for-broader-region.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

legitimize their actions and facilitate progress for the Egyptian society. Although the implementation of the constitution is a long time coming, the idea of a civil society is now common knowledge in the Egyptian population. In comparison to the pre-Arabellion era, the major change in Egypt is that the all-embracing lethargy and paralysis of the Mubarak regime is gone. The country is now a refuge of vivid change, progress and setbacks, hope and violence. Although the future of the country is still uncertain, there is no doubt anymore that there will be a future, different from the present. This awareness is the quintessence responding the thesis question how the Arabellion affects the strength of Egypt as a nation state.

A Side Glance: Egypt, the Spine of the Arabic World?

In August 2014, the Palestine ambassador in Cairo Jamal Schobak replied to the question as to Egypt's role as mediator in the Middle East conflict: "Egypt is the spine of the Arabic World."¹⁶⁰ As stated initially, Egypt has been a central player in the Greater Middle East.

However, with the Arabellion in 2011 the country temporarily left the arena of regional foreign policy. In the aftermath, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia attempted to take over Egypt's traditional role as a key force of stability and mediation. The era of President Morsi did not achieve greater success and represented a phase ambiguity. While the Muslim Brotherhood officially communicated that the relationship with Israel might be in question, the government in fact followed the pragmatic approach of its

¹⁶⁰ Hans Michael Ehl, "Gaza Friedensverhandlungen, Aegypten als ehrlicher Makler?" ARD-Hoerfunkstudio Kario, 7 August 2014, accessed 30 October 2014, <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/aegypten-hamas-israel-vermittler-101.html>.

predecessor. The mediated ceasefire between the Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip in 2012 is the only success of the foreign policy of President Morsi. Even his idea of a closer relationship to Iran did not improve, because both countries supported opposing actors in the Syrian civil war.¹⁶¹ With the inauguration of President El Sisi, Egypt initially focused on its domestic problems again, but the government quickly started attempts to reverse Egypt's recently diminished role. In view of the current processes of upheaval, civil war, and terror in the region there is more than ever the need for a powerful and reliable mediator. In the context of the Arabellion, the thesis offers a side-glance at Egypt's current role and foreign policy.

How the Arabellion Affects Egypt's Role as a Regional Key Player

While the Arabellion implicated its temporary withdrawal from an active role in foreign policies, the challenges remained unchanged. Egypt is principally still predestinated to play a leading role in the Middle East conflict, because of the realities of geography and the diplomatic relations with both the Palestine National Authority and the Israeli government. Furthermore, with Libya, Syria, and Iraq, there are several trouble spots in the neighborhood. Thereby, Egypt's general capability to project considerable political, diplomatic, and to a limited extent military power is not questioned. However, how did the events of the Arabellion change the current government's foreign policy?

The foreign policy comprises two supporting pillars. First, the president picked up the idea of Karama, dignity that the youth movements chanted in 2011. In particular, in the relationship with the United States, President El Sisi publicly emphasizes the

¹⁶¹ IHS Jane's, "Executive Summary, Egypt," article #5, 61.

sovereignty of the country, refuses interference in matters of domestic concern, and withstands Western pressure in order to increase the population's approval and its own legitimacy.¹⁶² Second, the domestic quest for stability also continues in the country's foreign policy. The focus on Egypt's own stability led to even a more pragmatic approach.

First, during and in the aftermath of the latest war in Gaza, Egypt revealed a shift in its role as a point of contact for the Hamas and Israel from a mediator with its own interests to an interested party that mediates.¹⁶³ Actually, Egypt delayed its criticism of the Israeli invasion and enabled a more lethal impact on the Hamas' structures in Gaza. In fact, President El Sisi's reluctance was an extension of the domestic struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood to the allied Hamas. Furthermore, the lack of interference supported their own security interests on the Sinai Peninsula and improved the relationship with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Finally, a disruption of the Hamas is always convenient for the opposing Fatah Party that calls itself the representative of the Palestinian cause. That is why the latest Egyptian position might have caused less damage to its mediation than expected. A continued role as mediator between Israel and the Fatah Party in order to gain international reputation is still possible.

¹⁶² David D. Kirkpatrick, "As Egyptians Grasp for Stability, Sisi Fortifies His Presidency," *The New York Times*, 7 October 2014, accessed 31 October 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/08/world/as-egyptians-grasp-for-stability-sisi-fortifies-his-presidency.html?_r=0&module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Middle%20East&action=keypress®ion=FixedLeft&pgtype=article.

¹⁶³ Michael Wahid Hanna, "The Sisi Doctrine," *Foreign Policy*, 13 August 2013, accessed 31 October 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/13/the_sisi_doctrine_egypt_policy_gaza_israel_iraq.

Second, the pragmatic quest for stability in the Egyptian neighborhood goes along with a focus on its own security, but a lack of constructive diplomacy. In the face of the Libyan civil war, Egypt limits its activities to border protection measures. This new realpolitik goes to such lengths that even the Shia-Sunni-conflict becomes peripheral and enables the Egyptian government to establish first contacts to Iran's allies in Syria and Iraq.¹⁶⁴ Aside from the Gaza conflict, only the increasing influence of Al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil-Iraq wa al-Sham forced the El Sisi government to accept a more comprehensive diplomatic involvement.

In summary, the foreign policy of President El Sisi is strongly affected by the Arabellion of 2011. In simple terms, the Egyptian government pursues the goal to preserve control at any price and transferred this strategy to its foreign policies, too. The result is a very pragmatic approach to counter threats for the country's stability, possibly risking credibility. Egypt still has the power to return to a policy of the most important key player and mediator in the Greater Middle East. However, a change in foreign policy is closely connected to a shift in the domestic strategy.

Realpolitik Dictates the Egyptian-Israeli Relationship

The peace between Egypt and Israel of 1979 has often been described as "cold peace" as it was the result of a purely power-political decision made by the Egyptian leadership at that time under Anwar Al Sadat. It has never led to the societies getting closer to each other,¹⁶⁵ which exactly describes the core of the problem in the relationship

¹⁶⁴ Hanna.

¹⁶⁵ Roll, "Länderporträt Ägypten," 161.

between both countries. Almost four years after the beginning of the Arabellion, it can be stated that despite two overthrows and changing rhetoric and ideology, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty had never really been jeopardized.¹⁶⁶ The realpolitik-oriented relations and interdependencies have just been too strong.

Overall, the current government follows the same principles in its relationship with Israel as its predecessors. This part of Egyptian foreign policy is determined by well-known parameters that lead rather to more pragmatism than a general change. The approach in the Gaza War last August is the latest proof.

On the other hand, the end of the idea of an “Arab Spring”¹⁶⁷ in the neighborhood and the change of most upheavals in civil wars reinstated Israel’s comfortable situation. The country benefits again from the exclusive privileges due to being the only democracy in the Greater Middle East. Moreover, the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan allow Israel to redirect considerable financial funds to the benefit of its own economy and provided it the opportunity to concentrate its military efforts on the security of the Syrian border and the conflicts with Hezbollah and Hamas when necessary.¹⁶⁸

Furthermore, the Arabellion in Egypt did not ever seriously challenge the peace treaty. Both countries arranged themselves with the status quo.¹⁶⁹ In this respect, it is

¹⁶⁶ “Neuer Präsident will Friedensvertrag mit Israel überdenken,” *De Zeit*, 25 June 2012, accessed 22 August 2014, www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2012-06/mursi-wahlreaktionen; Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 188.

¹⁶⁷ Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 7-9.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 188-189.

¹⁶⁹ Refer to Jürgen Stryjak, “Mursi und der Westen. Ägypten richtet seine Außenpolitik neu aus,” 29 September 2012, accessed 7 February 2014, www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/einewelt/1879920.

apparent that the alliance of convenience formed at Camp David in 1979 will continue rather than trying to transform the cold peace into a real one. There is no need for change from a pragmatic point of view; on the contrary, the current situation facilitates the instrumentalization of the Palestinian cause. In summary, as long as Egypt and Israel have no need to adapt their *modus vivendi*, there will be few chances for positive impacts to a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Egyptian Arabellion as a Role Model?

In the published opinion exists an ongoing discussion whether the so-called “Arab Spring” was a failure.¹⁷⁰ The best answer is to state that the Western idea and definition of an “Arab Spring”¹⁷¹ was a failure. Of course, it was not only coincidence that the upheavals started in many countries in the Greater Middle East 2010 and 2011. There is certainly a cultural correlation and sometimes a sequence of events; and certainly all uprisings had their particular reasons, history, and were exposed to specific influences.

The term “Arabellion”¹⁷² is an appropriate description, accommodating what the upheavals have in common and what separates them; the common element of revolts in a similar cultural area against an existing authority must not obstruct the view on the present discrepancies in the Greater Middle East. The so-called Islamic State challenges the state integrity of Syria and Iraq. The same integrity seems to be almost lost in the civil

¹⁷⁰ Rainer Sollich, “Opinion: Tunisia as a Regional Role Model,” Deutsche Welle, 28 October 2014, accessed 31 October 2014, <http://www.dw.de/opinion-tunisia-as-regional-role-model/a-18024580>.

¹⁷¹ Perthes, *Der Aufstand. Die arabische Revolution und ihre Folgen*, 7-9.

¹⁷² Scholl-Latour, 8.

wars of rivaling militias in Libya and Yemen. On the other hand, there are the shining example Tunisia and the new bad guy Egypt.¹⁷³

However, the last two attributes create a wrong impression. Indeed, the parliamentary elections in Tunisia last October indicate more progress in the application of democracy. The former largest faction the Islamist Ennahda Party lost the polls against the Nidaa Tounes Block, a coalition of former regime and secular forces, publicly congratulated the winner, and announced to continue its political activities. However, these promising signals are still accompanied by a weak economy, mass unemployment, and possibly the return of the old regime's cadres into political power. The further developments remain to be seen. Furthermore, Tunisia's historically and geographically peripheral position in the Greater Middle East suspends a possible position of a role model for other countries. On the contrary, it remains to be analyzed whether this peripheral position prevents an influence of external interests to corrupt the democratic process.

Generally, the demand for a role model is debatable due to the complexity and the inconsistency of trends in the region. The more productive question is whether Egypt is now, and in the future, an island in the Arabic Sea that is capable of projecting and exporting stability. Based on the reestablished order, Egypt already projects relative stability in particular in comparison to its neighbor Libya. On the other hand, the export of stability is not Egypt's current main aim. The activities in foreign policies currently just support the inward focus of national stability. Whether Egypt will be a center of stability or will take over an active role as mediator and key player in the region, depends

¹⁷³ Ibid.

on the course of action the government of President El Sisi chooses, or maybe already chose for the country.

The Future Prospect: a Possible Course of Development

Egypt still faces the protraction and complexity of a long-lasting post-rebellion phase. Although the current state of the country is more than pure restoration of the pre-Arabellion era, the future remains largely unclear. Thus far, there has been progress as well as setbacks. The Arabellion leaves a population, and in particular a youth aware of its potential and influence. Moreover, the failed experiment with a free elected government leaves its mark. In addition, the current governments, as well as the relevant protagonists face a recent pressure to legitimize their actions and facilitate progress for the Egypt society.

As already highlighted, President El Sisi's decision about a course of action for the country will decisively shape the future political and social order. With an eye on the decisions the government made so far its tendency towards realpolitik is evident. Therefore, the ongoing oppression of the Muslim Brotherhood and the delay due to the implementation of the Constitution of 2014, indicate the attempt of the administration to generate a maximum of stability and control before beginning the next step of change. In fact, the elites try to avoid an assumed mistake they made after the Arabellion of 2011. This time they want to manage the necessary change from a superior position, because the need for development is without question in order to secure political power in the end. The risk is to miss the right time to initiate further progress. Nevertheless, President El Sisi's long-term goal is still the full implementation of the constitution. On the way there, he too accomplishes two prerequisites.

On one hand, there is the reintegration of parts of the disrupted Muslim Brotherhood, because a total annihilation of the network is unrealistic. The integration of the most powerful opponent on terms will underpin El Sisi's legitimacy and reputation. From the Muslim Brotherhood's perspective, this step is in the foreseeable future the only realistic chance of political participation. The necessary ideological realignment would presumably split the organization paired with a significant loss of credibility, in particular after the government's brutal suppression and the death of thousands of members. Therefore, the process of reconciliation will be accompanied by the constitution of a conglomerate of small and radical Islamic splinter groups.

On the other hand, the country is still missing a new parliament. Its statutory setting will be the most apparent signal of progress in the framework of the constitutional order. At this point, Egypt will not be a democracy in terms of Western standards; but it provides the institutions that allow the study and exercise of democracy, as well as the constant development of a pluralism that is open to compromise. Furthermore, the constitution already comprises the next steps to a more balanced sharing of powers; it dictates both the temporary authority of the National Defense Council to appoint the minister of defense and the two terms limit to stay in office for the head of state.

The last one will be the litmus test for Egypt's future. Are the society, the still preeminent military, and President El Sisi capable of and willing to fill the democratic elements of the Constitution of 2014 with life? A positive answer offers the chance to follow the pragmatic course of well-controlled pluralism and guided democracy. A further re-balance of authoritarian and democratic elements towards more pluralism, could then enable sufficient space for a dynamic development of individual basic

rights.¹⁷⁴ Consequently, in the long-term perspective the role of the Egypt Armed Forces could be the one of a curator of the nation. The appropriate benchmark to define the degree of change will be the depicted triangle model of Charles Wright Mills. Thus far, the only certainty is that the Egyptian experimental side will go on.

Recommendations for Further Studies

Without a doubt, the Greater Middle East will go on to be an important field of study. In particular, the Arabellion, its effects, and the development of the societies of the region are red-hot topics in the truest sense of the word. Insofar the guiding theme of this thesis “How does the Arabellion affect the strength of Egypt as a nation state” offers on its own plenty of options for further research. Furthermore, the topicality and the ongoing development of the subject compel periodically an updated consideration and reflection of events and relevant actors. In a general context, an observation of the events in Tunisia offers a possible benchmark for evaluation; especially with reference and critical reflection of the emphasized Western press and public opinion.

Moreover, further research on the impact of foreign policies, relevant foreign actors, and events will be a valuable contribution. In particular, the role of the so-called Western nations in comparison to other global players like Russia and China in worth researching. Finally, the current events in Syria and Iraq, the rise of the Islamic State and the impact on Egypt’s national integrity, as well its role as a potential regional key player disclose a field for further research.

¹⁷⁴ Jochen Hippler, “Die arabische Revolution: Von der Diktatur zur Demokratie?” *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, Monatszeitschrift, Blätter Verlagsgesellschaft mbH*, no. 4 (2011): 73.

APPENDIX A

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